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REBALANCING COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION
Guy A. Rub*
ABSTRACT
In 2013, in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Supreme Court wrote
another chapter in the ongoing story of copyright exhaustion. This ruling is
part of a vibrant discourse and a series of recent decisions in high-profile
cases, domestically and internationally, regarding the scope of copyright
exhaustion and, more broadly, the ability of copyright owners to control the
distribution of their work along the chain of commerce. Unfortunately, this
discussion rarely explores the modern justifications for copyright exhaustion,
which makes it notoriously incoherent and confusing.
This Article suggests that copyright exhaustion serves an important social
function of reducing information costs. Without it, buyers will need to
inefficiently waste resources inquiring whether they will be able to resell
copyrighted work. Because resale rights are typically socially desirable, the
law should usually provide those rights to buyers. Copyright exhaustion also
has costs. The main costs are the reduction in the incentives to create and a
regressive distributive effect that are the result of the limitations that copyright
exhaustion places on certain price-discrimination practices. The balance
between these benefits and costs should dictate the scope of copyright
exhaustion.
This Article applies this balanced approach and explores the desired scope
of copyright exhaustion. It concludes, inter alia, that it should not prevent
copyright owners from exercising control over commercial importation of
copyrighted goods or over distribution of digital work. However, contracting
around copyright exhaustion should be restricted, and copyright owners
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should not be allowed to circumvent it just by including “magic words” in
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INTRODUCTION
When can copyright owners control the distribution of their works along
the chain of commerce? Can John import a CD of copyright-protected music
he purchased in Thailand to the United States, or does he need to secure
permission from the copyright owner to do so? Once the CD is in the country,
can John sell it on eBay? Can Clarence, who purchased the CD from John,
resell it to Ruth? Can Ruth rent it to Elena? How do the answers to these
questions differ if instead of buying a physical CD, John would have purchased
a digital album on iTunes?
In recent years, these and similar highly controversial questions have been
the subject of several high-profile cases, including three that reached the
United States Supreme Court.1 Answering these questions requires courts and
litigants,2 as well as federal agencies,3 international negotiators,4 and scholars5
to address the exact scope of the doctrine of copyright exhaustion.6
The core principles of copyright exhaustion—also known as “the first sale
doctrine”—are easy to grasp. Copyright exhaustion, whose principles are
presented in Part I, is the doctrine that balances the interests of owners of
copyright and the interests of the owners of copies in which the copyrighted

1

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013); Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega,
S.A., 562 U.S. 40 (2010) (per curiam) (mem.); Quality King Distrib., Inc., v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523
U.S. 135 (1998).
2 See, e.g., Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. 1351; Costco, 562 U.S. 40; Quality King, 523 U.S. 135; UMG
Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011); Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir.
2010).
3 See, e.g., INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, COPYRIGHT POLICY, CREATIVITY, AND
INNOVATION IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY 35–37 (2013), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/
publications/copyrightgreenpaper.pdf [hereinafter COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY] (a report of the
Department of Commerce regarding the distribution of digital work).
4 In recent years, international free trade agreements typically address the rights of copyright owners to
control importation of their work. See Margot E. Kaminski, The Capture of International Intellectual Property
Law Through the U.S. Trade Regime, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 977 (2014).
5 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A Classical Liberal
Response to a Premature Obituary, 62 STAN. L. REV. 455, 501–09 (2010); Aaron Perzanowski & Jason
Schultz, Digital Exhaustion, 58 UCLA L. REV. 889 (2011); Glen O. Robinson, Personal Property Servitudes,
71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1449 (2004); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, The New Servitudes, 96 GEO. L.J. 885 (2008).
6 The equivalent doctrine in patent law—patent exhaustion—has also been subject to extensive
discussion in recent years, including in two prominent cases that were decided by the Supreme Court. Bowman
v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008).
While this Article focuses on copyright exhaustion, most of its analysis is applicable, with appropriate
adjustments, to patent exhaustion as well.

RUB GALLEYSPROOFS2

744

2/19/2015 12:32 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:741

work is embodied.7 Specifically, this doctrine provides that once copyright
owners transfer ownership in copies of their works, their rights to control
future distribution of those copies is exhausted.8 The buyers are therefore free
to transfer the copies as they please.
Unfortunately, applying this doctrine in our global village and the digital
world, in which copies can easily move between countries and work can be
copied and distributed exceedingly fast, both physically and digitally, is
challenging. This challenge is exacerbated because copyright exhaustion is
under theorized. Indeed, many judges and commentators take the principles of
copyright exhaustion and their ancient justifications as a given without
questioning them.9 As one scholar noted, copyright exhaustion is “one whose
justification is still underdeveloped despite a century of mechanical
recitation.”10
This Article tackles this difficulty by reexamining the justifications for the
norms of exhaustion in light of modern developments in technology, in other
areas of the law, and in economics. It concludes that copyright exhaustion is
justified as a tool to reduce information costs in markets for copyrighted goods.
However, this socially desirable goal should be weighed against the reduction
in incentives to create, and a possible regressive distributive effect that
copyright exhaustion causes. This balance should dictate the scope of
copyright exhaustion. This Article also rejects other possible justifications for
the doctrine as either unconvincing or insignificant.

7

See Aaron Perzanowski & Jason Schultz, Copyright Exhaustion and the Personal Use Dilemma,
96 MINN. L. REV. 2067, 2107–09 (2012).
8 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012).
9 Even those few commentators who address the justifications for copyright exhaustion typically take
extreme views. Compare Epstein, supra note 5, at 502–03, Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Sale Restraints and
Competitive Harm: The First Sale Doctrine in Perspective, 66 NYU ANN. SURV. AM. L. 487 (2011), and
Robinson, supra note 5 (all questioning whether there is any general justification for copyright exhaustion),
with Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 5, and R. Anthony Reese, The First Sale Doctrine in the Era of
Digital Networks, 44 B.C. L. REV. 577 (2003) (all providing a list of unquestionable benefits to copyright
exhaustion). This Article advocates for a more balanced approach.
10 Robinson, supra note 5, at 1479; see also Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Touching and Concerning
Copyright: Real Property Reasoning in MDY Industries, Inc. v. Blizzard Entertainment, Inc., 51 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1063, 1064 (2011) (“[T]he exhaustion concept is fuzzy around the edges and frustratingly
under-theorized . . . .”).
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Copyright exhaustion emerged in the early twentieth century.11 As
explained in Part II, at the time of its emergence, copyright exhaustion was
rationalized, to a large degree, by several related principles: the common law
refusal to recognize servitudes on chattels, its bar on almost all restraints on
alienation of property, and, above all, the antitrust policy that prohibited
practically all vertical restraints.12 However, our views of those principles have
changed during the last century, mainly because modern sophisticated
economic models questioned their justifications and broad application.13
Development in the law followed, and these doctrines are no longer strictly
applied but instead are subject to a rule of reason test.14 Therefore, those
principles, which are now narrower and more flexible, can no longer justify the
broad and strict doctrine of copyright exhaustion. Unfortunately, some courts
and commentators, including recently the Supreme Court, continue to rely on
those ancient principles.15 This continued reliance on historic principles that
are too weak to justify copyright exhaustion nowadays makes the doctrine
incoherent and confusing, and, more troubling, can prevent it from promoting
desirable social goals.
Part III explores the effects of copyright exhaustion on the famous
incentives–access tradeoff. It suggests that from that perspective copyright
exhaustion might be socially costly. The facts of the recent Supreme Court
decision in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. can illustrate this effect. The
defendant in this case earned significant amounts of money by purchasing
textbooks in Thailand and selling them in the United States.16 In doing so, he
took advantage of the copyright owner’s decision to engage in price

11 The doctrine was created in Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908), and was codified a year
later in the Copyright Act of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (later codified as 17 U.S.C. § 41 (1926))
(repealed 1976).
12 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 5, at 1470.
13 See Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 514–15.
14 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (applying a rule of
reason to resale minimum price arrangement); Robinson, supra note 5, at 1456–58 (exploring twentieth
century cases in which courts enforced servitudes on chattels); Joseph William Singer, The Rule of Reason in
Property Law, 46 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1369, 1410 (2013) (restraints on alienation of property are subject to an
unreasonableness test); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY (SERVITUDES) § 3.4 (2000) (“A
servitude that imposes a direct restraint on alienation . . . is invalid if the restraint is unreasonable.”).
15 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) (“The ‘first sale’ doctrine is a
common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree.”).
16 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1375 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“[K]irtsaeng imported and then sold at a profit
over 600 copies of copyrighted textbooks . . . .”); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210, 215 (2d
Cir. 2011) (noting that Kirtsaeng admitted to earning $900,000 in revenues while the plaintiff’s counsel
suggested that his revenues were $1.2 million).
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discrimination and sell books in Thailand for a fraction of their price in the
United States.17 Therefore, when the Supreme Court held that copyright
exhaustion applies to Kirtsaeng’s actions and thus they did not constitute
copyright infringement, it also held that the publisher’s ability to engage in
international price discrimination is limited.
While the Supreme Court did not seem to be troubled by this de facto
limitation on price discrimination,18 this Article suggests that from a policy
perspective, restricting this type of a pricing scheme is likely undesirable. This
restriction is expected to reduce the incentives to create, in many cases, maybe
most, without improving access to the work.
Part IV considers other possible modern justifications for copyright
exhaustion and finds them unconvincing or too weak to support the broad
scope of the doctrine. It is shown that copyright exhaustion does not increase
the level of spillovers from the distribution of copyrighted work but in fact
might shrink them, which is socially harmful. Correspondingly, it also might
create an undesirable regressive distributive effect by transferring wealth from
the typically poorer to the typically richer buyers. In addition, copyright
exhaustion is not a required condition for having vibrant markets in which
copyrighted works are resold and shared. In fact, modern markets in which
copyrighted works are being distributed in innovative ways have emerged and
proliferated in recent years, even where copyright exhaustion is inapplicable,
such as in the digital world. Netflix streaming, iTunes, Amazon’s Kindle, and
Pandora are just a few examples of this trend. Other important social goals,
including the preservation of old copyrighted goods or the protection of
buyers’ privacy, cannot justify copyright exhaustion as well because the
linkage between them and its scope is too feeble. Copyright exhaustion applies
in many situations in which neither preservation nor privacy are concerned and

17 See Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1356. Price discrimination in information goods was subject to extensive
discussion in copyright literature in recent years. See, e.g., William W. Fisher III, When Should We Permit
Differential Pricing of Information?, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1 (2007); Randal C. Picker, From Edison to the
Broadcast Flag: Mechanisms of Consent and Refusal and the Propertization of Copyright, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
281 (2003); Guy A. Rub, Contracting Around Copyright: The Uneasy Case for Unbundling of Rights in
Creative Works, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 257 (2011).
18 See, e.g., Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1370; Quality King Distribs., Inc., v. L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523
U.S. 135, 151 (1998) (suggesting that copyright exhaustion should be interpreted broadly because a prohibition
on unlicensed importation “would merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.” (quoting
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450–51 (1984)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
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does not apply in many cases that are crucial to the promotion of those
desirable social goals.
Copyright exhaustion creates important social benefits as well. The main
benefit, explored in Part V, is a reduction in information costs. The doctrine
helps to create a reasonably clear standard set of rights that buyers receive
when they buy copyrighted goods. Because those rights are important in the
buyers’ buying decision, without copyright exhaustion, they would need to
waste resources in verifying their rights, which is inefficient. Part V further
explains that without copyright exhaustion some markets will include a mix of
copyrighted goods that can and cannot be resold, and that in such a case, if the
buyers cannot easily distinguish between the various goods, those markets
might significantly shrink. This phenomenon, which economists call “the
market for lemons,”19 might be especially devastating to domestic resale
markets such as eBay. Finally, Part V suggests that these information costs
might affect laypersons significantly more than professional repeat buyers.
Part VI shows how those identified costs and benefits can help answer
several of the open questions regarding the scope of copyright exhaustion. This
Part demonstrates how reshaping—or rebalancing—the scope of copyright
exhaustion can efficiently lower the cost and increase the benefits of copyright
exhaustion. First, the analysis suggests that because of the differences in the
economic characteristics of domestic and international markets, the law should
treat importation and domestic resale differently. This Article thus suggests
that while copyright exhaustion should be broadly applied in domestic markets,
allowing the copyright owner to exercise control over importation, a regime
called national exhaustion (or, in its weaker form, regional exhaustion), is
supported by sound economic reasoning. The analysis thus provides a strong
policy support to a position taken in Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion in
Kirtsaeng.20
Second, copyright exhaustion should not be extended to digital works.21
Because digital files can typically be easily and indefinitely transferred, an
19 See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970).
20 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1372–73 (Kagan, J., concurring). This opinion, which implicitly calls for
reversing the Supreme Court’s precedent set in Quality King, was joined by Justice Alito. See id.; see also Guy
A. Rub, The Economics of Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc.: The Efficiency of a Balanced Approach to
the First Sale Doctrine, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. RES GESTAE 41, 52–53 (2013) (advocating the same).
21 See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 654–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (holding that
the principles of copyright exhaustion do not apply to digital work). This position is inconsistent with the
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unrestricted right to do so may potentially cause significant harm to the market
of copyright owners and substantially reduce the quantities they are able to
sell. The market for digital works might not be experiencing a
high-information-costs problem, and it is innovative and fast growing without
the need to mandate a legal right to transfer digital works.
Third, this Article questions whether allowing commercial for-profit
renting of copyrighted works, which might be a unique feature of U.S. law,22 is
socially desirable. In contrast, a policy that allows public not-for-profit
libraries to freely lend copyrighted goods, which is common in many
jurisdictions,23 might be economically justified.
Fourth, this Article explores whether parties should be allowed to contract
around the rules of copyright exhaustion.24 This is an exceptionally complex
question. This Article concludes that contractual provisions that are
inconsistent with the rules of copyright exhaustion should be enforced when
they are included in negotiated contracts, but they should be subject to legal
scrutiny when they are part of standard-form agreements.
Finally, this Article addresses the distinction between a sale and a mere
license. Under current law, only a sale triggers copyright exhaustion,25 but
distinguishing between transactions that are sales and those that are not is
difficult and highly controversial. This Article argues that when the economic
realities of a transaction clearly indicate that title was not transferred, limiting
copyright exhaustion might make sense. In contrast, it is inefficient to allow
copyright owners to circumvent the rules of copyright exhaustion by including
certain language—“magic words”—in their standard-form agreements that
categorizes a transaction that looks like a sale as a mere license. This Article
position of the European Court of Justice, see Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp., 2012
E.C.R. I-0000, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ0128,
and with the views of several scholars, see, e.g., Clark D. Asay, Kirtsaeng and the First-Sale Doctrine’s
Digital Problem, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 17 (2013); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 5; cf. Eugene
Volokh, The Future of Books Related to the Law?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 823, 830–32 (2010) (suggesting that
controlling digital distribution will allow publishers to offer better terms).
22 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012); cf. Directive 92/100, on Rental Right and Lending Right and on Certain
Rights Related to Copyright in the Field of Intellectual Property, 1992 O.J. (L 346) 61 (EC) [hereinafter Rental
Directive] (granting copyright owners an exclusive right to commercially rent and lend copyrighted works).
23 See, e.g., Rental Directive, supra note 22, art. 5, at 63–64.
24 This issue is part of a broader discussion regarding the legality of contracting around core doctrines in
copyright law. See, e.g., MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
THE RULE OF LAW 168–73 (2013); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual
Property Licensing, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 111, 118–33 (1999); Picker, supra note 17; Rub, supra note 17.
25 17 U.S.C. § 109(d).
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thus provides support to the approach of the Second Circuit,26 which focuses
on the economic realities of the transaction, and rejects the approach of the
Ninth Circuit, which formally focuses on the language of the contract between
the parties.27
I. ON COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION
A. Copyright Exhaustion in Context
Anne publishes a book she wrote and sells a copy of it to Ben. Several sets
of legal rules govern this transaction.28 First, the transaction between the
parties is a contract for the sale of goods, and therefore, it triggers the default
rules that are part of contract law, as well as the parties’ additional agreed upon
terms. The transaction involves the transfer of ownership and possession of the
copy, and thus it is also governed by personal property law. Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code deals with certain aspects of such transactions
under both contract law and property law.29
Typically, upon the completion a transaction for the sale of goods, title in
the goods passes to the buyer, Ben, and he can then do with them almost
whatever he pleases, including transferring them to others. However, when the
goods in question are protected by intellectual property rights, the nature of the
transaction changes and the buyer’s rights are more limited. Certain actions are
prohibited by intellectual property law. Those actions are referred to as the
exclusive rights, and, by default, these rights are not transferred to a buyer of
items protected by intellectual property rights.
If the goods are subject to copyright law protection, the exclusive rights
include, among other things, the right to reproduce the good, the right to
distribute it, and the right to publically perform and display it.30 Indeed, while
the buyer of a piece of furniture can present it in public, the buyer of a

26

See, e.g., Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005).
See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
28 The set of legal rules mentioned in this paragraph is of course incomplete. The transaction can trigger
legal principles that are parts of other areas of the law: the publishing of a book, for example, is affected by
environmental law, labor law, and corporate law; the transaction between Anne and Ben is a tax event, and so
on.
29 While Article 2 is typically considered to be part of contract law, some parts of it deal with certain
property law aspects of transactions for the sale of goods. For example, U.C.C. §§ 2-401 to 2-403 (2014), deal
with the transfer of tittle in those transactions.
30 17 U.S.C. § 106.
27
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copyrighted painting might not enjoy the same right.31 The exclusive rights
thus create a tension between the rules governing personal property and
intellectual property law.32 Copyright law deals with this tension and balances
the conflicting interests through the doctrine of copyright exhaustion, which is
also known as the first sale doctrine.33
Under this doctrine, currently codified in Section 109(a) of the Copyright
Act, the owner of a copy of a protected work (e.g., a book or a CD) has the
right to transfer that copy to others.34 Thus, this doctrine significantly
weakened the control that copyright owners enjoy over the distribution of
copies of their works.
B. A Comparative Look at the Scope of Copyright Exhaustion
In recent years, courts and commentators have struggled with questions
regarding the scope of copyright exhaustion. For example, in 2013, the
Supreme Court addressed a circuit split regarding the scope of the doctrine
with respect to copyrighted goods that are manufactured abroad and imported
into the United States.35 Lower courts and commentators, as well as the U.S.
Copyright Office and the Internet Policy Task Force within the Department of
Commerce, currently struggle with a host of other issues, such as whether the
doctrine applies to digital works36 and when a seller can continue to exercise
control over future distribution of a work by classifying transactions as mere
licenses instead of sales.37 The decisions on these issues are expected to affect
billions of dollars of sales.38
31 Copyright owners have an exclusive right to control public display of their works. Id. § 106(5).
However, in some cases this right is exhausted and limited. Id. § 109(c). Analyzing the part of the exhaustion
doctrine that limits copyright owners’ ability to control the public display of their works is beyond the scope of
this Article.
32 See Van Houweling, supra note 10, at 1064.
33 The name “copyright exhaustion” is common in foreign jurisdictions, while in the United States it is
used interchangeably with “the first sale doctrine.” See SHUBHA GHOSH, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE &
SUSTAINABLE DEV., THE IMPLEMENTATION OF EXHAUSTION POLICIES: LESSONS FROM NATIONAL
EXPERIENCES 3 (2013), available at http://www10.iadb.org/intal/intalcdi/PE/2014/13661.pdf. The equivalent
doctrines in other areas of intellectual property law are patent exhaustion and trademark exhaustion. Id.
34 This right is subject to numerous exceptions. Many of them are discussed infra Part VI.
35 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
36 See Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); COPYRIGHT IN THE
DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 35–37.
37 See, e.g., Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010).
38 See, e.g., Steven Seidenberg, Market Mayhem: Sale of Gray Market Goods Heads to the Supreme
Court, INSIDE COUNS. (Feb. 1, 2010), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2010/02/01/market-mayhem (“In the IT
sector alone, gray market goods accounted for $58 billion in U.S. sales in 2007, costing the industry $10
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Comparative law suggests that there is no natural scope to the copyright
exhaustion doctrine. Every legal system has rules regarding the exhaustion of
copyright. In all legal systems some transactions trigger exhaustion, which in
turn limits the scope of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner with respect
to a copy of the work. However, the scope of the rules governing exhaustion
substantially differ among legal systems. In particular, legal systems differ in
answering two questions: first, what transactions trigger exhaustion, and
second, in what way exhaustion narrows the scope of the exclusive rights.
While an authorized domestic sale of copyrighted goods typically triggers
exhaustion, an authorized sale abroad might not. In countries that apply a
regime called “national exhaustion,” such as India,39 only a domestic sale
triggers exhaustion. In those jurisdictions, the copyright owner’s permission is
required to sell items that were first sold in another country. In other words, the
copyright owner de facto receives an exclusive right over importation. In other
countries, those that implement “international exhaustion,” which following
the recent Supreme Court decision in Kirtsaeng also includes the United
States,40 a sale anywhere in the world triggers worldwide exhaustion with
respect to the item sold. Finally, in other jurisdictions, those that implement
“regional exhaustion,” exhaustion is triggered by an authorized sale within a
certain region. For example, any sale of protected work in any part of the
European Union triggers exhaustion within all other countries of the European
Union.41 Thus, a copyright owner can limit the distribution in France of a book
first sold in the United States but not of a book first sold in Germany.

billion in profits . . . .”); see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Costco Wholesale Corp. in Support of Petitioner at 1,
Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. 1351 (No. 11-697), 2012 WL 2832444 (“With annual sales of more than
$70 billion, . . . . Costco is known for selling genuine brand-name merchandise . . . at prices lower than its
competitors. The first-sale doctrine [i.e., copyright exhaustion] plays an important role in Costco’s ability to do
so.”).
39 GHOSH, supra note 33, at 39–40. It should be noted that under Indian law rights in some kinds of
copyrighted works, e.g. movie DVDs, are never exhausted. Id.
40 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. 1351. Prior to this decision, the United States had an inconsistent mixed system
of rules regarding exhaustion. While a sale of items manufactured domestically triggered exhaustion regardless
of the place of sale (as is the case under an international exhaustion regime), see Quality King Distribs., Inc. v.
L’anza Research Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 151 (1998), the law regarding items manufactured abroad was
disputed. Cf. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Kirtsaeng, 654 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2011) (finding that rights with
respect to items manufactured abroad are never exhausted), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 1351; Denbicare U.S.A. Inc. v.
Toys “R” Us, Inc., 84 F.3d 1143 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that only an authorized domestic sale of item
manufactured abroad triggers exhaustion); Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Consumer Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d
1093 (3d Cir. 1988) (holding that every authorized sale, domestic or not, of any copyrighted item triggers
exhaustion).
41 GHOSH, supra note 33, at 36–37.
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The effect of exhaustion once it is triggered also varies among jurisdictions.
In the European Union, for example, even after exhaustion (i.e., after an
authorized sale in the European Union), the holder of a copy of a copyrighted
work (e.g., a book or a CD) is not allowed to rent it to others.42 However,
countries in the European Union are allowed to permit public libraries to lend
copies for free as long as the copyright holder is compensated.43 In Israel, after
exhaustion, commercial renting is prohibited, but noncommercial lending,
including by public libraries, is allowed even without compensation of the
author.44 In the United States, after exhaustion (i.e., an authorized sale), the
owner of a copy is allowed to rent and lend it for any purpose, for profit or
not.45
Indeed, there is no global consensus regarding the scope of copyright
exhaustion. International Intellectual Property norms do not regulate
exhaustion. The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic
Works does not address the topic of exhaustion. The Agreement on Trade
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) goes a step further and
explicitly states that “nothing in this Agreement shall be used to address the
issue of the exhaustion of intellectual property rights.”46
Therefore, comparative law does not shed light on the desirable scope of
copyright exhaustion. This Article instead suggests that exploring the
justifications for copyright exhaustion might provide better answers. That
examination starts—with the historic rationales for the doctrine—in the next
Part.

42

Rental Directive, supra note 22, art. 4, at 63.
Id. art. 5, at 63–64.
44 Copyright
Act, 5768–2007, 2007 LSI 34, § 17 (Isr.), translation available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=255135 (Word Intellectual Prop. Org., trans.). While in Israel
compensation to the authors’ for public lending is not required by law, the state customarily provides it. Other
countries have similar practices. See generally Charles A. Masango & Denise Rosemary Nicholson, Public
Lending Right: Prospects in South Africa’s Public Libraries?, 74 S. AFR. J. LIBR. & INFO. SCI. 49 (2008),
available at http://sajlis.journals.ac.za/pub/article/view/1257/1404 (examining the ways in which different
countries compensate authors for the public lending of their work).
45 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). However, the owners of phonorecords (e.g., music CDs) and software are
not permitted to rent or lend those goods for profit. Id. § 109(b).
46 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, art. 6, Apr. 15, 1994, 108 Stat.
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299.
43
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II. HISTORIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION
What are the justifications for copyright exhaustion? Why shouldn’t the
copyright owner control the distribution of copyrighted works? This Part
explores whether the historic theoretical pillars that contributed to the creation
of the doctrine a century ago can justify and help shape its scope nowadays. It
concludes they cannot.
Copyright exhaustion originated in the Supreme Court decision in
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus.47 In that case, the plaintiff, Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
included a notice in a copyrighted book stating it was not to be sold for less
than $1. The defendant, R.H. Macy & Company (now commonly known as
Macy’s), sold the book for eighty-nine cents and was sued for copyright
infringement.48 The Supreme Court held that the copyright owner’s exclusive
right to “vend” copies in which the work is embodied extends to the first sale
of those copies but not to a future resale.49 The first sale thus exhausts the
copyright owner’s distribution rights. For that reason, Bobbs-Merrill could not
have controlled the resale of the book by R.H. Macy & Company.
A year later, this principle was codified in the Copyright Act of 1909.50 A
similar provision (although not an identical one) was later included in the
Copyright Act of 1976.51
While Bobbs-Merrill is a statutory interpretation case,52 the decision cannot
be fully understood without appreciating several general legal principles that

47

210 U.S. 339 (1908).
Id. at 341–42.
49 Id. at 350–51.
50 ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1075, 1084 (later codified as 17 U.S.C. § 41 (1926)) (“[N]othing in this title
shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of
which has been lawfully obtained.”) (repealed 1976).
51 Pub. L. 94-553, § 109(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2548 (codified as amended as 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012))
(“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106(3), the owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully
made under this title, or any person authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the
copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord.”). While many
perceive Section 41 of the 1909 Act and Section 109 of the 1976 Act as the codification of the Bobbs-Merrill
precedent and the principles of copyright exhaustion, some have argued that the doctrine is broader than the
statutory language, and therefore exhaustion can be found even when a transaction falls outside the scope of
Section 109. See, e.g., Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent at 27–29,
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013) (No. 11-697), 2012 WL 3902599; Perzanowski
& Schultz, supra note 7, at 2113–15.
52 Specifically, the Court in Bobbs-Merrill interpreted Section 4952 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States, which read “Any . . . author . . . of any book . . . and the . . . assigns of any such person, shall . . . have
48
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dominated the discussion on exhaustion of intellectual property early in the
twentieth century.53 These principles include the extreme hostility to vertical
restraints along the chain of distribution and the common law rule that
prohibited servitudes on chattels and restraints on alienation. This Part explores
these theoretical pillars. It suggests that a century ago these principles were
broadly accepted and strictly applied, which can explain why the rules of
exhaustion were similarly strict. However, nowadays these principles are more
controversial and their application is subject to flexible legal standards.
Therefore, the strict rules of copyright exhaustion can no longer be supported
by these principles. This Part therefore suggests that, to paraphrase Maitland,54
unfortunately, these theoretical historic justifications we have buried still rule
us from their graves.
A. Regulating Vertical Restraint: From Strict Per Se Prohibition to a Narrow
and Flexible Rule of Reason Test
The Bobbs-Merrill decision and the emergence of copyright exhaustion
cannot be entirely understood without appreciating the extreme hostility to
vertical restraints that was common at the time.55 The plaintiff in
Bobbs-Merrill tried to exercise control along the distribution chain by
implementing a minimum resale price maintenance (RPM) scheme,56 which at
the time was considered anticompetitive and per se illegal under antitrust

the sole liberty of . . . vending the same.” See 210 U.S. at 348 (quoting U.S. Comp. St. § 4952 (1901) (repealed
1909)).
53 Patent exhaustion emerged several decades before copyright exhaustion in Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) 453 (1873). The two doctrines, while not identical, rely to some extent on similar theoretical
principles, which are presented in this Part of the Article.
54 F. W. MAITLAND, Lecture I: The Forms of Action at Common Law, in EQUITY ALSO THE FORMS OF
ACTION AT COMMON LAW 295, 296 (A. H. Chaytor & W. J. Whittaker eds., 1910) (“The forms of action we
have buried, but they still rule us from their graves.”).
55 Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 504 (“Over history, most of the Supreme Court’s decisions on the first
sale doctrine have attached its rationale to competition policy.”); Ariel Katz, The First Sale Doctrine and the
Economics of Post-Sale Restraints, 2014 BYU L. REV. 55, 65–66 (“[T]he first sale doctrine and antitrust law’s
treatment of vertical restraints are nothing but two sides of the same coin.”); Perzanowski & Schultz, supra
note 7, at 2113; Robinson, supra note 5, at 1453–54 (“[T]he first sale doctrine first arose in the context of
resale price restraints—an antitrust offense of long standing.”). For a detailed discussion on the hostility to
vertical restraints and its effect on the exhaustion of intellectual property rights, see Hovenkamp, supra note 9,
at 503–10. The discussion in this sectionrelies on Professor Hovenkamp’s article.
56 Resale price maintenance (RPM) refers to various practices that are designed to keep a certain
limitation on the price of a product along the chain of commerce. See Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 488. The
most common version of RPM, sometimes called minimum resale price scheme, attempts, as its name
suggests, to place a mandatory minimum retail price (a floor) for a certain product.
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law.57 In fact, many post-sale restrictions on alienation, which are typically
inconsistent with the principles of copyright exhaustion, can be described as an
attempt to enforce vertical restraints.58 In the first decades of the twentieth
century, most of those arrangements were considered per se illegal under
antitrust law.59
This patent hostility can be explained by the perception that those
arrangements are typically, if not always, designed to limit competition along
the distribution chain. Thus, when Bobbs-Merrill set a minimum price of $1
for its books, it limited competition among retailers. If, for example, it sold the
books to retailers for eighty cents, then it would allegedly be anticompetitive to
prevent those retailers to compete with one another and offer the book for less
than $1. In addition, many were concerned that some vertical restraints allowed
monopoly pricing along the chain of distribution, and so the monopolist
copyright owner can allegedly extend its monopoly power from one market to
another, currently competitive, market.60
Modern economics, and in particular the economists of the Chicago school
of economics, showed that those concerns are oversimplified and in many
cases overstated or wrong.61 First, vertical restraints, including tying

57 Dr. Miles Med. Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373, 408 (1911) (holding RPM schemes are
per se unlawful under antitrust laws), overruled by Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551
U.S. 877 (2007) (applying a rule of reason); see also Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 504–10.
58 Vertical restraints are limitations that are placed along different parts of the chain of manufacturing
and distributing a product. See Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 488–89. For example, in Kirtsaeng, the publisher
was trying to create a geographic exclusivity arrangement—a form of a vertical restraint, which can guarantee
that books that are initially sold abroad remain in their original distribution chain. See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1356 (2013). Adobe, in SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems Inc., 171 F.
Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001), tried to enforce another type of a vertical restraint, called a tying arrangement,
see infra note 62, in which two (or more) products are always sold together along the chain of distribution.
59 See, e.g., Clayton Act, ch. 323 § 3, 38 Stat. 730, 731 (1914) (current version codified at 15 U.S.C. § 14
(2012)) (tying arrangements illegal); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Universal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. 502
(1917) (tying arrangements are unenforceable as a matter of patent law, which is supported by antitrust
concerns, as expressed by the Clayton Act); supra note 57.
60 See ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR WITH ITSELF 372–75 (1978).
61 See, e.g., BORK, supra note 60, at 373–81; Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust
Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 925 (1979); Robinson, supra note 5, at 1501–02.
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arrangements,62 usually do not allow a monopolist63 to earn more than a single
monopoly premium along the distribution chain, and it typically cannot extend
its monopoly power to related competitive markets. Thus, for example, if a
company has a monopoly in the market for printers but the market for ink
cartridges is competitive,64 it cannot increase its total profits by tying the
printer and the ink cartridges (i.e., forcing buyers to buy its own cartridges) or
by setting a minimum price in the ink market. The consumers’ purchasing
decisions are determined by the combined price of the printer and the
cartridges, and, therefore, no matter what vertical restraints are implemented,
the monopolist can extract one monopoly rent on this combination as a whole.
Even if the products are tied, it can do so by, inter alia, charging a monopoly
price for the printer and a competitive price on cartridges, or vice versa, but the
monopolist will not charge a full monopoly rent in both markets because it will
raise prices for the consumer and will reduce quantities to a level that is
undesirable for the monopolist.65
Second, vertical restraints can sometime have pro-competition effects.
They, among other things, encourage interbrand competition instead of
intrabrand competition and thus they can eliminate free riding.66 Mandatory
62 A tying arrangement is the practice of selling one product (or service) as a mandatory condition of
selling another product (or service). See, e.g., Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 488. Interpreted broadly, typing
arrangements are very common. Law schools, for example, condition the service of teaching first-year
Contracts on the teaching of first-year Torts. Of course, antitrust law defines tying arrangements more
narrowly. See, e.g., Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 19 (1984). Several well-known
copyright exhaustion cases can be thought of as analyzing tying arrangements. See supra note 58. A full
analysis of the efficiency (or lack thereof) and legality (or lack thereof) of tying arrangements is well beyond
the scope of this Article.
63 The term monopolist, as used here, refers to an economic actor with significant market power, not
necessarily an actor who is the sole seller in a given market or a company that will be considered a monopolist
under antitrust law.
64 This example is loosely based on the facts of Illinois Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547
U.S. 28, 31–33 (2006).
65 There are of course exceptions to this rule. For example, if there are high barriers to entry in the
competitive market, the seller can cross subsidize its products in the competitive market, sell them below costs,
and drive its competitors out of the market. This can be desirable to the monopolist if, for example, it can help
deter entrance to related markets. Thus, for example, if the monopolist producer of printers can drive
competitors out of the market for ink cartridges, and if barriers to entry are high for that market, this can help it
solidify its monopoly position in the market for printers. See also Louis Kaplow, Extension of Monopoly
Power Through Leverage, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 515, 520–39 (1985) (exploring situations in which a monopoly
position can allow a monopolist to extend its monopoly power).
66 Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 490. Interbrand competition is competition between sellers of different
brands. See id. at 488–89. Intrabrand competition is a competition between the sellers of the same brand. See
id. at 488. Thus, as explained below, tying arrangement can encourage competition between brands (e.g.,
Toyota versus Honda) while possibly discouraging competition within a brand (e.g., between two near Toyota
dealerships).
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minimum prices, for example, can facilitate non-price competition and thus
incentivize retailers to offer additional point-of-sale services. Without them,
retailers who do not provide those services might free-ride those who do
provide them. For example, online retailers might free-ride on brick and mortar
retailers who provide expensive showroom services to buyers. This will create
a disincentive to provide the point-of-sale service, which might harm the
market share of the product. The manufacturer can tackle this difficulty by
enforcing a minimum retail price along the chain of distribution. This of course
might be inconsistent with the principles of copyright exhaustion, which, as
demonstrated in Bobbs-Merrill, makes the enforcement of those arrangements
difficult.
For those reasons, antitrust law moved away from the per se prohibition on
vertical restraints, overruling many of the precedents in this area, and instead
applies a rule of reason test.67 Indeed, instead of holding all vertical restraints
illegal, the modern rule of reason test requires the fact-finder to weigh all of
the circumstances of a case in deciding whether a practice should be prohibited
as imposing an unreasonable restraint on competition and whether that practice
has an anticompetitive or procompetitive effect.68
This progress creates a tension between antitrust law and intellectual
property law. While antitrust law permits many vertical restraints, as they can
promote, or at least not harm competition, the exhaustion rules of intellectual
property law might make their enforcement difficult. Indeed, while some
modern commentators attribute pro-competitive rationales to copyright
exhaustion,69 the inflexible nature of that doctrine seems inconsistent with our
sophisticated modern understanding of the economic forces at play in vertical
restraints arrangements.
It is important to note that some vertical restraints do raise competitive
concerns, especially when they facilitate horizontal restraints (i.e., between

67 See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007) (applying the rule of
reason to resale minimum price arrangement); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997) (applying the rule of
reason to vertical determination of a maximum resale price); Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S.
36 (1977) (applying the rule of reason to non-price vertical restraints); Case C-279/06 CEPSA Estaciones de
Servicio SA v LV Tobar e Hijos SL, 2008 E.C.R. I-6681 (applying the rule of reason to vertical restraints
under European Union law).
68 Leegin, 533 U.S. at 885–86.
69 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) (discussing the need to
promote competition as a justification for copyright exhaustion); Reese, supra note 9, at 585 (discussing the
ways in which copyright exhaustion fosters competition).
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direct competitors), which are anticompetitive.70 For example, a cartel among
manufactures that is designed to keep prices artificially high can be unstable
because of the difficulty to observe the price that cartel members charge their
distributors. A minimum RPM scheme can assist the cartel because the prices
charged to consumers are easy to monitor.71 Similarly, a cartel among retailers
can be enforced by the manufacturer (at the cartel’s demand) using a minimum
RPM scheme. This can make entry to the retail market difficult and discourage
innovations along the distribution chain.72
Therefore, promoting competition can sometimes justify limitations on
vertical restraints (with respect to items protected by intellectual property
rights and those that are not) but in other cases, which might be more common,
they cannot.73 Antitrust law can handle those situations in which vertical
restraints harm competition better than copyright exhaustion.74 By restraining
many types of vertical restraints, anticompetitive (such as those in

70

Leegin, 551 U.S. at 892–94.
This is in fact the exact scheme that motivated the minimum RPM scheme in Bobbs-Merrill. Katz,
supra note 55, at 67–68. This, of course, seems to be a clear violation of antitrust law, as existed then and as
exists now. However, in Bobbs-Merrill, because the Supreme Court held that the manufacturer cannot enforce
its RPM scheme under copyright law, it did not see a need to discuss the alleged violation of antitrust law.
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 351 (1908).
72 Leegin, 551 U.S. at 893–94. Similar conditions can emerge even without a cartel. For example, if a
distributor has a significant market power, it can force vertical restrains on manufacturers and limit their
transaction with competitors and thus eliminate competition. See Toys “R” Us, Inc. v. FTC, 221 F.3d 928 (7th
Cir. 2000).
73 Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 492 (“[T]hese reasons [for limiting vertical restraints because of antitrust
concerns] do not exist in every case, or even the majority of them.”); cf. Leegin, 551 U.S. at 915–16 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (arguing that it is unclear how often vertical price maintenance arrangements are
pro-competitive).
The decrease in the barriers to entry in many copyright industries might make it less likely that vertical
restraints would be anticompetitive. See Guy A. Rub, Stronger than Kryptonite? Inalienable Profit-Sharing
Schemes in Copyright Law, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49, 128–29 (2013); Molly Shaffer Van Houweling, Author
Autonomy and Atomism in Copyright Law, 96 VA. L. REV. 549, 615 (2010); Joel Waldfogel, And the Bands
Played On: Digital Disintermediation and the Quality of New Recorded Music (June 25, 2012) (unpublished
manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2117372.
However, even the reduction in the barrier to entry cannot completely eliminate antitrust concerns in
copyright related industries. For example, the Department of Justice recently claimed that a few large book
publishers were engaged in limited collusion, possibly in concert with Apple. See Final Form Joint Brief for
Plaintiffs-Appellees United States and Plaintiff-States at 4, United States v. Apple Inc., No. 13-3741 (2d Cir.
July 15, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f306100/306194.pdf; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, ANTITRUST CASE FILINGS, UNITED STATES V. APPLE, INC. (2013), available at
http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/applebooks.html.
74 See Robinson, supra note 5, at 1453 (“[A]ntitrust policy provides a completely sufficient grounds for
withholding legal enforcement of the restrictions [on alienation] and makes it separately actionable.”).
71
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Bobbs-Merrill) or not (such as those in Kirtsaeng),75 copyright exhaustion
seems too rigid and significantly over-inclusive, and it can thus undermine the
pro-competitive goals of antitrust policy. Indeed, it tries to kill a fly with a
sledgehammer, and it sometimes misses. In contrast, antitrust law (as well as
antitrust lawyers and the Federal Trade Commission) is equipped with tools to
handle such complex situations, primarily through its flexible rule-of-reason
jurisprudence.76
The conclusion is that it is doubtful if the copyright exhaustion doctrine is a
desirable tool to promote competition. However, even if it can promote
competition, in its current strict form, it is unlikely to be able to do so. The
inflexibility of copyright exhaustion was suitable in the era of the per se
prohibition on vertical restraints but as we have abandoned this approach in
antitrust law, the continued strict enforcement of the rules of exhaustion cannot
be justified by pro-competition policy.
B. Restraints on Alienation of Property and Servitudes on Chattel: From a
Broad Prohibition to a Limited Reasonableness Test
Common law refused to enforce most restraints on alienation of property
and it did not recognize servitudes on chattel. Both prohibitions, but especially
the hostility to restraints on alienation, inspired the emergence of copyright
exhaustion, and they fuel its discourse to this day. The Supreme Court recently
stated that “[t]he ‘first sale’ doctrine is a common-law doctrine with an
impeccable historic pedigree.”77 The Court went on to explain how Lord Coke,
in the early seventeenth century, relying on a fifteenth-century opinion of Lord
Littleton, had held that enforcing such limitations is “against Trade and
Traffi[c], and bargaining and contracting” and concluded that a “law that
permits a copyright holder to control the resale or other disposition of a chattel
once sold is similarly ‘against Trade and Traffi[c], and bargaining and
contracting.’”78

75 As further discussed in infra Part III, the plaintiff–sellers in Kirtsaeng tried to implement a geographic
segmentation scheme, which typically does not raise antitrust concerns. Indeed, the parties to Kirtsaeng did not
raise such arguments.
76 See also Robinson, supra note 5, at 1503–04 (calling for a flexible regulations through antitrust law of
vertical restraints that do not go beyond what is justified by specific public policy).
77 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013).
78 Id. (alterations in original) (quoting EDW. COKE, THE FIRST PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWES OF
ENGLAND § 360, at 223 (London, Adam Islip 1628)).
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Relying on either Lord Littleton’s or Lord Coke’s reasoning or on the
common law rule to justify copyright exhaustion in the twenty-first century is
problematic. Both Littleton and Coke held that enforcing restraints on
alienation is “repugnant to the nature of a fee,” which means that it is
inconsistent with the technical nature of the common law estate.79 There are at
least two main obstacles in applying this reasoning to copyrighted goods. First,
if the nature of the property interest in question in those old common law
authorities did not permit restraints on alienation, it should not automatically
lead us to conclude that the property interest at question in Kirtsaeng, which is
quite different in nature, incorporates the same technical limitation. Second,
and more importantly, relying on the technical argument regarding the
repugnancy to the nature of a fee is problematic in itself and was heavily
criticized by later commentators. For example, Professor John Chipman Gray,
who in 1883 published the leading treatise on restraints on alienation,
“contended that forbidding restraints in our modern law would be unjustified if
repugnancy were the only reason.”80 Similarly, in 1935 Professor Richard
Manning wrote that “continued use of the argument of repugnancy as a short
cut to a desired result or to conceal a rule not founded on public interest is, to
say the least, lamentable.”81 Most modern commentators agree.82
This last point requires elaboration. Both Gray and Manning supported
prohibiting most restraints on alienation, but their justifications were based on
the economic realities and the context in which those limitations on alienation
were placed. Historically, the prohibition on restraints on alienation emerged in
the thirteenth century as a way to deal with the land structure in feudal
England.83 Centuries later, in the nineteenth century, Gray was truly concerned
with the phenomenon of spendthrift trusts, in which restraints on alienations
limit the creditors’ ability to reach the corpus of the trust.84 Gray saw it as a
79

Richard E. Manning, The Development of Restraints on Alienation Since Gray, 48 HARV. L. REV. 373,
401 (1935).
80 Manning, supra note 79, at 402 (citing JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON THE ALIENATION OF
PROPERTY § 21 (Boston, Boston Book Co., 2d ed. 1895)).
81 Id. at 402–03.
82 See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 5, at 465–68; Robinson, supra note 5, at 1453, 1481 (suggesting that
relying on the common law prohibition on restraints of alienation nowadays is “flimsy”); see also Zechariah
Chafee, Jr., Equitable Servitudes on Chattels, 41 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1928) (suggesting similarly that not
enforcing servitudes on chattel is unjustified).
83 Robinson, supra note 5, at 1480.
84 Spendthrift trusts allow the grantor to limit the transferability of the corpus of the trust, including to
creditors of the beneficiaries of the trust. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 58 (2003); Karen E. Boxx,
Gray’s Ghost—A Conversation About the Onshore Trust, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1195 (2000) (exploring Gray’s
opposition to spendthrift trusts); Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the Bottom?,
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misguided paternalistic policy that is inconsistent with the Anglo-Saxon
traditions of individualism and a step toward socialism.85 Whether we agree
with Gray’s criticism of spendthrift trusts or not is beside the point. The point
is that the hostility toward restraints on alienation was—and should still be—
supported by sound public policy that was motivated by the economic realities
of the time. It is far from being self-evident that the economic realities of our
time support a similar hostility. Those who are quick to rely on this historic
hostility do not provide such evidence. It is doubtful it exists. Clearly, the
concerns about creditors’ rights that motivated Gray and Manning have
nothing to do with copyright exhaustion. Most of the other rationales that
Gray, Manning, and other scholars and judges raised to justify the prohibition
on restraints on alienation—e.g., a desire to hold people accountable for their
debts, to allow improvement of property, or to fight racial discrimination86—
are similarly inapplicable to copyright policy.
In fact, property law itself abandoned its strict resentment toward
restrictions on alienation. Nowadays, in most jurisdictions, the common law’s
strict approach has been rejected even with respect to real property. Instead,
restraints on alienation are subject to a general reasonableness test to determine
whether they are enforceable.87 In some cases, which might not be common,
courts also seem willing to enforce some servitudes on chattels.88 These
modern developments in property law suggest that the automatic broad refusal
in common law to enforce restraints on alienation is no longer warranted.
Thus, the continued reliance in copyright discourse on the obsolete
principles of the common law seems inadequate. In some cases, hostility to
restraints on alienation can be supported by economic arguments, but those
arguments must be articulated and evaluated. As the modern developments in
real property law suggest, once the economic arguments are no longer
convincing, the law should no longer strictly refuse to enforce those
restrictions. Arguments regarding the “repugnancy to the nature of a fee” no
longer carry the day in real property discourse. Relying on authorities that
embraced this ancient reasoning is thus unfortunate. Indeed, contrary to the

85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035, 1043 (2000) (explaining that although spendthrift trusts used to be controversial
they have “become an entrenched feature of American trust law”).
85 Manning, supra note 79, at 403–04.
86 Id.
87 Singer, supra note 14.
88 Robinson, supra note 5, at 1456–58 (exploring twentieth-century cases in which courts enforced
servitudes on chattel, including servitudes that facilitated price discrimination).
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recent assertion of the Supreme Court,89 the “historic pedigree” of copyright
exhaustion is quite short of being “impeccable.”
Almost eighty years ago, Professor Manning cautioned that the
enforceability of restraints on alienation “is peculiarly responsive to changing
conditions and times”90 and that courts should rely on “a more cogent line of
reasoning than those depending upon the metaphysics of repugnancy.”91 The
next Parts of this Article answer this call by exploring whether, and to what
extent, the prohibitions on restraints on alienation, as facilitated by copyright
exhaustion, are supported by the economics of copyright related markets.
III. THE COST OF COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION: THE EFFECTS ON THE
INCENTIVES–ACCESS TRADEOFF
The previous Part suggests that the legal principles that inspired the
emergence of the copyright exhaustion doctrine cannot justify it today.
Therefore, these principles can provide very limited assistance in determining
the scope of the doctrine. This Part, together with Part IV and Part V, examines
additional possible rationales for copyright exhaustion.
This Part focuses on copyright exhaustion’s effect on the balance between
incentives to create and public access to information goods. It suggests that
because copyright-exhaustion doctrine restricts the copyright owner’s ability to
engage in a certain pricing scheme—collectively called price discrimination—
the application of the doctrine typically has an undesirable effects on social
welfare.
Section A explains how a sound copyright policy aims to promote both
authors’ incentives to create works and public access to the works created.
Section B introduces price discrimination as a common pricing scheme that is
employed by many copyright owners. Section C explains how copyright
exhaustion restricts the copyright owners’ ability to engage in certain kinds of
price-discrimination schemes. Then, the most important section in this Part,
section D, explores the welfare effects of those limitations. It concludes that
copyright exhaustion typically reduces the incentives to create and has only a
modest effect on access to copyrighted work.
89 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1363 (2013) (“[T]he ‘first sale’ doctrine is a
common-law doctrine with an impeccable historic pedigree.”).
90 Manning, supra note 79, at 373.
91 Id. at 404.
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One important note is in order. In this Part, Part III, as well as in the next
Part, Part IV, it is assumed that there are negligible information costs in the
market for copyrighted goods. The reason for making this assumption is purely
methodological. Parts III and IV explore whether copyright exhaustion can be
justified without relying on its socially desirable effect on information costs.
They conclude that it cannot. That conclusion will play a crucial role in later
Parts of this Article. In Part V, the assumption regarding negligible information
costs is relaxed, which will allow the reader to fully appreciate the significance
of copyright exhaustion in reducing information costs.
A. On the Incentives–Access Tradeoff
A sound copyright policy must incentivize the creation and distribution of
creative works and to provide wide access to those works.92 However, those
two goals typically conflict with one another and therefore the promotion of
one needs to be balanced against the promotion of the other. This is the famous
incentives–access tradeoff. This section briefly presents the problem of
promoting incentives and access. Later sections explore how copyright
exhaustion affects this balance.
The first goal of copyright law, and in many respects its raison d’être, is to
provide incentives to create.93 The production of information goods is typically
socially desirable, partly because they are non-rivalrous, i.e., the consumption
by one buyer does not harm the consumption of another. Thus, when Charlie
listens to a song on the radio, Dan can listen to the same song at the same time
without bothering Charlie. Therefore, the production of one information good
can benefit many. Unfortunately, without legal intervention, information goods
can typically be copied easily, which will give uncontrolled access to
nonpayers and will deny income to the creator. Competition can drive prices
down close to the marginal cost of production, which will prevent the author

92 This is of course not a complete list of all the goals of copyright law. Additional goals include, among
other things, protecting the authors’ personhood and labor interest in the work, promoting other social goals
such as a robust market of ideas, and more.
93 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984) (noting that
copyright is “intended to motivate the creative activity of authors . . . by the provision of a special reward”);
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress
to grant patents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare . . . .”).
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from recouping the cost of creation94 and will discourage the author from
producing information goods.
Legal intervention might therefore be required.95 Intellectual property law
remedies this problem by allowing the producer of information goods to
exclude some nonpayers. The provider of information goods thus faces just
limited competition and can charge a price that is above the marginal cost of
production and thus covers the fixed costs of creation. This is the assent of the
incentive theory, which is at the core of intellectual property law in the United
States.96
While copyright law provides incentives to create, it also restricts public
access to information goods by limiting competition and granting the copyright
owner some market power.97 When market power allows the seller to price
goods for more than their marginal cost of production, some buyers—those
that are willing to pay more than the marginal cost of production but less than
the monopoly price—are priced out of the market.98 In this way, the law limits
access to the work. This is inefficient. From a social perspective, a transaction
in which a seller transfers a good to a voluntary buyer for a price that is above
the marginal cost of production is beneficial to all parties and therefore to
society at large. By fostering higher prices, copyright law denies society the
potential surplus from those lost transactions. This loss of surplus is called a
deadweight loss, and it is a common socially undesirable side effect of
intellectual property law.
94 Because the fixed costs of creating information goods are high and the marginal costs are very low, the
average cost is typically higher than the marginal cost. As a result, if competition drives prices toward
marginal costs, the total cost of production (the average cost multiplied by the number of copies sold) cannot
be recovered.
95 Cf. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LAW 41–49 (2003) (showing that in some cases creators can recover the fixed cost of creation
without relying on intellectual property rights, while in other cases they cannot).
96 Other legal systems, in particular civil law jurisdictions, justify copyright law on other grounds and, in
particular, on the author’s’ natural rights. See generally Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two Copyrights: Literary
Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. REV. 991 (1990) (exploring the different
justifications for copyright law under French and United States law).
97 See, e.g., Sony, 464 U.S. at 480 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“Copyright gives the author a right to limit
or even to cut off access to his work.”); Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright
in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 313 (1970) (“Removing copyright
protection should induce competition in the production and sale of relatively high-volume titles. Readers of
these books should benefit from lower prices.”); Jeanne C. Fromer, Expressive Incentives in Intellectual
Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 1745, 1752 (2012) (“[E]xclusive rights in intellectual property can prevent
competition in protected works, thereby allowing the rightsholder to charge a premium for access and
ultimately limiting these valuable works’ diffusion to society at large.”).
98 Rub, supra note 17, at 261.
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Unfortunately, there is an inherent and frequent conflict between providing
incentives and broadening access. This conflict is commonly referred to as the
“incentives–access tradeoff.”99 Most legal norms that increase the incentives to
create also reduce access to the work and vice versa.100 However, norms differ
in the magnitude of those effects.101 Therefore, copyright law should consist of
norms that provide authors with significant incentives102 with little reduction to
access as well as norms that provide significant access with little harm to
incentives.
With these criteria in mind, the effects and desirability of copyright
exhaustion can be evaluated. It will be shown that this doctrine typically
reduces incentives to create without increasing public access to copyrighted
works and thus, under these criteria, it is undesirable. The reduction in
incentives stems from the limitation that copyright exhaustion places on price
discrimination, to which this Article now turns.

99 See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 228 (1990) (“[T]he [Copyright] Act creates a balance
between the artist’s right to control the work during the term of the copyright protection and the public’s need
for access to creative works.”); Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799,
1801–03 (2000).
100 For example, expanding the copyright owner’s exclusive rights to include derivative works gives
authors an additional source of income and thus improves the incentives to create. However, at the same time,
this expansion raises the cost of creating derivative products (e.g., translations) and thus reduces the access to
those works. Similarly, the fair use defense provides that some usages (e.g., parody) do not require a license
and are therefore cheaper, which improves access to the work, but at the same time it denies authors a source
of income and thus reduces the incentives to create.
101 See Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1821
(1984) (noting in the context of patents that “[i]t is simply not true that all activities generating equal profits
impose equal damages upon society”); Rub, supra note 17, at 279.
102 It is possible to provide too much incentive to create. See Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial
Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 71–77 (2004) (suggesting that
according to certain models of imperfect competition over-incentivizing can lead to excessive entry into a
given market, which wastes resources); Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 212, 260–64 (2004) (same); see also Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Copyright’s Price Discrimination Panacea,
21 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 387 (2008) (suggesting that over-incentivizing can channel valuable social resources to
inefficient creative activities). It is difficult to know if the current incentives to create have reached that point
and this Article does not settle this question. Nevertheless, the analysis in this Part implies that if the incentives
are too high, reducing them by restricting price discrimination is, all else being equal, undesirable. Other
incentive-enhancing mechanisms that are part of our copyright law regime are significantly more harmful as
they significantly harm access and spillovers. Therefore, if reduction in incentives is desirable, these other
mechanisms should be restricted first. See Rub, supra note 17, at 275–76 (explaining how a regime that
broadens price discrimination and shortens copyright duration is superior to a regime that prohibits price
discrimination and extends copyright duration).
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B. Price Discrimination in the Market for Copyrighted Goods
Defining the term “price discrimination” is not a trivial task. As a leading
economic treatise puts it, “[r]oughly, it can be said that the producer
price-discriminates when two units of the same. . . good are sold at different
prices. . . . This definition is unsatisfactory.”103 This section explains how
copyright owners can employ price-discrimination schemes to deal with
variation in demand among their buyers.104 The next section will explain how
Copyright Exhaustion interferes with such pricing schemes.
Sellers with market power105 choose prices for their products that will
maximize their total revenues. Price-discrimination schemes allow those sellers
to deal with buyers who vary in their willingness to pay. Economic literature
separates those schemes into three categories.106 With first-degree price
discrimination the seller charges each buyer a price equal to that buyer’s
willingness to pay. This scheme allows the producer to increase quantities and
sell the product to each buyer who is willing to pay more than the marginal
cost of production. Thus, the deadweight loss, which is a common side effect
of monopoly power,107 is eliminated. Unfortunately, perfect price
discrimination can rarely be achieved because the buyers’ reservation price is
private information that sellers do not know.108
Therefore, sellers have developed pricing schemes that allow them to
indirectly assess those reservation prices. Both second- and third-degree
price-discrimination schemes use an approximation method to sort the
consumers into subgroups and match a different price to each subgroup.
Second- and third-degree price-discrimination schemes differ in the ways in
which this sorting and estimation is done.

103

JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 133 (1988).
Price discrimination in information goods was subject to extensive discussion in copyright literature in
recent years. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 99; Fisher, supra note 17; Lunney, supra note 102; Michael J.
Meurer, Copyright Law and Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55 (2001); Randal C. Picker,
Easterbrook on Copyright, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165 (2010); Picker, supra note 17; Rub, supra note 17; Yoo,
supra note 102.
105 A seller who has no market power is a price taker and thus cannot make pricing decisions. However,
because intellectual property rights restrict competition, one may assume that owners of those rights have
some market power.
106 See, e.g., TIROLE, supra note 103, at 135; Rub, supra note 17, at 261–63.
107 See supra Part III.A.
108 See Rub, supra note 17, at 262.
104

RUB GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

2/19/2015 12:32 PM

REBALANCING COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION

767

Simply put, a second-degree price-discrimination scheme, also called
versioning, means that the seller offers slightly different versions of its product
for different prices to all consumers.109 The variations between the versions,
such as differences in quality or quantity, are evaluated differently by different
consumers and constitute a tool of self-selection that helps the seller to identify
those with higher willingness to pay and lower elasticity of demand.110 As an
example, consider the choice between Windows 8 and Windows 8 Pro or
between a hardcover book and a paperback. In both cases, the differences in
the cost of producing the different versions are small but the differences in
prices are significant. In those cases, the high-price, high-quality products
target those consumers with high willingness to pay and low elasticity of
demand. Those buyers do not mind paying significantly more to receive a
slightly better product.
When sellers implement a third-degree price-discrimination scheme, they
offer the same product to different subgroups of consumers for different
prices.111 The sellers use some exogenous known information about their
consumers (e.g., their age, occupation, location, etc.) to estimate the
consumers’ reservation prices. For example, movie tickets are cheaper for
senior citizens and textbooks are cheaper for buyers in developing countries
because, on average, senior-citizen moviegoers and textbook purchasers in
developing countries have a lower willingness to pay.
C. Price Discrimination, Arbitrage, and Copyright Exhaustion
While price-discrimination schemes allow sellers to serve buyers with
varying willingness to pay, in many cases their feasibility depend on the
sellers’ ability to prevent arbitrage through resale. Copyright exhaustion, by
fostering resale, thus limits the copyright owners’ ability to engage in price
discrimination.

109 See CARL SHAPIRO & HAL R. VARIAN, INFORMATION RULES: A STRATEGIC GUIDE TO THE NETWORK
ECONOMY 53–82 (1999); TIROLE, supra note 103, at 142–43.
110 See SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 109, at 53–82. Elasticity of demand measures how price sensitive
buyers are. Thus, when the elasticity of demand is low, buyers are not very price sensitive and therefore a
change in the price (e.g., a price increase) will cause a modest change in demand (e.g., lower demand). When
elasticity is high, buyers are price sensitive and thus every change in price will cause a significant change in
demand. In many cases, richer buyers are willing to pay more and have lower elasticity of demand while
poorer buyers are willing to pay less and have higher elasticity of demand. This is of course a simplified
representation of a much more complex relationship between wealth, willingness to pay, and elasticity of
demand.
111 TIROLE, supra note 103, at 137.
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Both second- and third-degree price-discrimination schemes can sometimes
be defeated by resale. For example, a software company might bundle together
several products and sell them at a discount, hoping to use this second-degree
price-discrimination scheme to identify heavy users who might be more price
sensitive and offer them cheaper products. An intermediary can defeat this
scheme by buying bundled products, unbundling them and sell the products
separately.112 Copyright exhaustion, which makes the intermediary’s action
legal,113 fosters this price-discrimination defeating practice.
Third-degree price-discrimination schemes are typically even more
vulnerable to resale. As explained above, those schemes are based on selling
the same product to different buyers for different prices when the buyers are
separated by some exogenous attribution.114 It is therefore obvious that if
reselling is allowed, then buyers who are part of a subgroup that is identified as
having a low reservation price will sell to buyers who are identified as part of a
group having a high reservation price.115
The facts of Kirtsaeng demonstrate this point. The copyright owner used a
type of a third-degree price-discrimination scheme known as international
geographic separation, which separates buyers based on the country of
purchase.116 Thus, the textbooks that the plaintiff in Kirtsaeng sold were
significantly more expensive to those who were part of the subgroup identified
as having a high willingness to pay (i.e., buyers in developed countries).117
Kirtsaeng defeated this scheme by a simple arbitrage: he purchased the product
in Thailand, for a price designed for Thai buyers, and resold them to college
students in the United States.118 If copyright exhaustion makes this practice
112 Those are the facts of SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal.
2001), in which the court found that unbundling the software and selling them separately do not constitute
copyright infringement because of the copyright exhaustion doctrine.
113 Id.
114 See supra Part III.B.
115 Those are the facts of Adobe Systems Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal.
2000). In that case, the defendant purchased copies of cheap student versions of the plaintiff’s product and
resold them to the general public. Id.
116 See Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1356 (2013).
117 See id. Textbooks are used as an example of copyrighted goods that are distributed internationally.
However, in some respects, college textbooks are unique. The decision to purchase these books is not being
made by those who are paying for them. Indeed, professors pick textbooks, but students pay for them. In
addition, from the professors’ perspective the cost of switching from one text book to the other is quite
substantial. Because of these factors, the competitive pressure on textbook manufacturers to keep price low is
limited and the demand very inelastic. A full analysis of these and other unique features of this specific market
are beyond the scope of this Article.
118 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1356.
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legal, as the Supreme Court held in Kirtsaeng, then the ability of copyright
owners to engage in geographic price discrimination is significantly limited.119
The distinction between second- and third-degree price discrimination is, in
many respects, illusory in this context. In some respects, as discussed above,
Kirtsaeng’s actions, as fostered by the copyright exhaustion doctrine, limited
the publishers’ ability to engage in third-degree price discrimination. But, from
another perspective, copyright exhaustion limits the publishers’ ability in
implementing a second-degree price-discrimination scheme. Copyright
exhaustion prevents the seller from separating buyers who buy the product just
for themselves from buyers who are resellers and who typically have a higher
willingness to pay. Copyright exhaustion bundles the copies of the product
itself with the right to resell those copies and thus defeats this kind of price
discrimination. In other words, if this kind of second-degree price
discrimination were feasible, Kirtsaeng’s actions would not have troubled the
publishing industry. Publishers would continue to sell cheap textbooks in
Thailand, which would not include an international right to resell, while
offering international resellers like Kirtsaeng a separate license, which would
probably be quite expensive. Copyright exhaustion, by giving all buyers a right
to resell the copyrighted goods they buy, makes such a separation impossible.
Indeed, copyright exhaustion, by making resale legal, can defeat many
price-discrimination schemes. The question is whether defeating price
discrimination in this way promotes the goals of copyright law. The next
section suggests that it typically does not.

119 A more dramatic example of geographic price discrimination of items protected by intellectual
property rights is provided by the pharmaceutical industry. This industry sells medicines in developed
countries for a price that is significantly higher than the willingness (and ability) to pay of almost all buyers in
developing countries. Price discrimination allows the industry to serve both markets. Arbitrage is a problem in
this market as well. Therefore, governments and international health organizations spend resources to
guarantee that distribution of life saving medicines in developing countries will not endanger the
pharmaceutical industry’s ability to charge high prices in developed countries. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski
et al., Addressing Global Health Inequities: An Open Licensing Approach for University Innovations, 20
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1031, 1093 (2005). This phenomenon poses a challenge for those who support
broadening the scope of exhaustion of intellectual property. See, e.g., Katz, supra note 55, at 78–81 (arguing
the pharmaceutical industry is unique); Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, Free Trade in Patented Goods:
International Exhaustion for Patents, 29 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 317, 371–76 (2014) (suggesting that the
pharmaceutical industry should by subject to special rules regarding patent exhaustion).
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D. The Welfare Effect of Restricting Price Discrimination
The previous sections suggest that sellers might want to engage in price
discrimination to address the differences in their buyers’ demand but that doing
so might be inconsistent with the principles of copyright exhaustion. But
maybe the limitations on price discrimination are socially desirable? Maybe it
is not a bug of the copyright exhaustion doctrine, but a feature? In Kirtsaeng,
the Court implicitly made that argument:
Wiley and the dissent claim that a nongeographical interpretation will
make it difficult, perhaps impossible, for publishers (and other
copyright holders) to divide foreign and domestic markets. We
concede that is so. A publisher may find it more difficult to charge
different prices for the same book in different geographic markets.
But we do not see how these facts help Wiley, for we can find no
basic principle of copyright law that suggests that publishers are
especially entitled to such rights.120

This section suggests that there are significant benefits to price
discrimination, and therefore one should be hesitant to interpret ambiguous
provisions in a way that limits this practice.121 It will be shown that a rule that
fosters price discrimination might be one of those rare instances in which
creation can be incentivized without a systematic reduction in access to the
work.122
Implementing a price-discrimination scheme affects the price in various
markets. In markets that are less sensitive to price changes (low elasticity), the
price is expected to increase.123 In Kirtsaeng, for example, this was the market
for textbooks in the United States. The price change increases the seller’s
benefits—the producer’s surplus (or else the seller would not have chosen to
increase prices),124 but because of the decrease in quantities, it also increases
120 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1370. In Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International,
Inc., the Court made an even stronger statement by suggesting that prohibiting unlicensed importation “would
merely inhibit access to ideas without any countervailing benefit.” 523 U.S. 135, 151 (1998) (quoting Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450–51 (1984)) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also infra Part V.A.
121 See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions,
101 YALE L.J. 331, 354 (1991) (exploring the assumption that “legislators are public-regarding—they ‘desire
to participate in formulation of good public policy’” (quoting STEVEN KELMAN, MAKING PUBLIC POLICY: A
HOPEFUL VIEW OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 261 (1987))).
122 See Kaplow, supra note 101, at 1873–78; Rub, supra note 17, at 273–75; supra Part III.A.
123 Rub, supra note 17, at 268.
124 This Article, and in particular this section, uses the producer’s surplus as a proxy to incentives to
create. This is not a perfect proxy because the correlation between the two is not linear. In other words, if the
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the deadweight loss and reduces the total social surplus. Indeed, some buyers
in those markets that were able to buy the product under the uniform price
scheme will be unable to buy it when price discrimination is implemented.
In markets with high elasticity of demand, i.e., with buyers who are more
sensitive to price changes (markets with high elasticity, typically markets that
are dominated by poor buyers), sellers who implement price discrimination
typically choose to reduce prices and increase quantities.125 The market for
English textbooks in Thailand is an example for such a market. Lowering the
prices in such a market increases the producer’s surplus (or else the seller
would not have chosen to decrease prices), but, because of the corresponding
increase in quantities, it also decreases the deadweight loss and increases total
surplus. Indeed, some buyers in high-elasticity markets are granted access only
because of the reduction in prices under a price-discrimination scheme. In its
extreme form, price discrimination does not just increase access in
high-elasticity markets, but it opens up markets that otherwise would not have
been served without it.126 Indeed, it is possible that without price
discrimination, publishers would not have sold English textbooks in Thailand
at all. With price discrimination, they did.
Therefore, this discussion suggests that implementing price discrimination
reduces total surplus in some markets and increases it in others. Economic
literature has studied this reality extensively in an attempt to explore whether
and when the total deadweight loss, taking all markets into account, decreases
or increases. The results are inconclusive.127 Pricing some consumers out of
low-elasticity markets is troubling because those buyers—who can be thought
of as the poor among the rich128—typically have a high willingness to pay
(although a lower willingness than many other participants in the low-elasticity
market). Pricing out buyers with a high willingness to pay significantly
producer’s surplus increases by a certain percentage the incentives to create might increase by a different
percentage. However, this imperfection should not diminish the claim made in this section. As discussed
below, this section suggests that price discrimination causes the producer’s surplus to increase in all markets—
elastic and inelastic. The section then argues that this guarantees that price discrimination increases the
incentives to create. This Article does not assume an exact correlation between the rate of change of the
producer’s surplus and the rate of change of incentives.
125 Rub, supra note 17, at 268.
126 Elsewhere I have called this phenomenon the “new markets effect.” Rub, supra note 17, at 267–68.
127 See e.g., TIROLE, supra note 103, at 138–39; Fisher, supra note 17, at 22–24; Meurer, supra note 104,
at 57; Rub, supra note 17, at 266–71.
128 See Rub, supra note 17, at 267–68. Those buyers are, for example, poor book buyers in the United
States that would be priced out of the market if a publisher implements an international geographic separation
scheme that raises prices in developed countries. Id.
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increases the total deadweight loss. In contrast, price discrimination typically
opens up new markets to the seller that would not have been served without it.
Price discrimination allows the producer to serve the masses in high-elasticity
markets, and it thus typically increases total quantities.129 In most cases, those
two effects partially cancel each other out, and therefore the overall effect of
price discrimination on the deadweight loss and on the access to the work is
usually expected to be modest.130
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there are cases in which it is likely that
price discrimination will improve total surplus and reduce deadweight loss. For
example, economic literature suggests that, as the discrepancy between the
elasticity (as well as willingness to pay) of different markets increases, it is
more likely that the high-elasticity (poor) markets will not be served at all
without price discrimination, and therefore price discrimination becomes more
likely to reduce the deadweight loss.131 Finally, in many real-life situations, the
poor among the rich are served by specific arrangements that bring them back
to the market.132 It is therefore not surprising that several empirical studies on
the effects of price discrimination in specific markets for information goods
showed that such policies decrease the deadweight loss.133
While the possible decrease in the deadweight loss represents improved
access to copyrighted works, which is socially desirable, this section makes a
significantly more modest claim: price discrimination is socially desirable,
even if one does not assume that it decreases the deadweight loss. As discussed
129 Economists have proved that an increase in total quantities is a necessary condition for a pricediscrimination scheme to reduce the deadweight loss. TIROLE, supra note 103, at 138. However, it is not a
sufficient condition.
130 See Rub, supra note 17, at 274–75.
131 David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price
Discrimination, 37 J. INT’L ECON. 167 (1994).
132 See Rub, supra note 17, at 272 (explaining how this strategy can reduce the deadweight loss). Public
libraries, for example, sometimes reach specific agreements with content providers that allow them to lend
digital copyrighted content (which, as further explore below, is not subject to copyright exhaustion) although
they are the archetypal “poor among the rich.” Similarly, many pharmaceutical companies implement
patient-assistance programs that provide cheaper medicines to noninsured and poor patients in developed
countries. See id.
133 In one study, economist Julie Mortimer found that the deadweight loss in the DVD market in the US,
where discrimination between buyers and renters is almost impossible because of the copyright exhaustion
doctrine, is higher than the deadweight loss in Europe, where the limited scope of exhaustion rules allows such
discrimination. Julie Holland Mortimer, Price Discrimination and Copyright Law: Evidence from the
Introduction of DVDs (Harvard Inst. of Econ. Research, Discussion Paper No. 2055, 2004), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=636064; see also Phillip Leslie, Price Discrimination in
Broadway Theatre, 35 RAND J. ECON. 520 (2004) (exploring decreased deadweight loss as a result of price
discrimination in Broadway theater).
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in Part III.A, a sound copyright policy should strive to incentivize creation
with minimal decrease in access. Because price discrimination increases the
producer’s surplus in all markets—low-elasticity and high-elasticity markets—
but has a mixed and typically modest effect on the deadweight loss, it is
typically a desirable policy. This is a policy that provides society with a cheap
tool to incentivize creation. A tool that incentivizes creation, which, unlike
most others, does not decrease access to the information goods.
Therefore, by limiting price discrimination, copyright exhaustion harms
copyright policy. It denies the creator incentives without increasing access to
the work.134
IV. OTHER POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION
The previous Part explores the effects of copyright exhaustion on authors’
incentives to create works and public access to the works created. It suggests
that by limiting the copyright owner’s ability to engage in some kinds of
second- and third-degree price discrimination, copyright exhaustion likely
reduces the incentives to create while probably not improving access to
copyrighted works. From that perspective, it is likely socially undesirable.
This Part looks at other possible effects of copyright exhaustion to explore
whether the doctrine can be otherwise justified in a world without significant
transaction costs. This Part thus explores the effects of copyright exhaustion on
the following: the pricing schemes used by sellers, the distributive impact of
copyright markets and the spillovers they generate, the existence of resale
markets, the preservation of old work, and buyers’ privacy. This Part
concludes that copyright exhaustion might have an undesirable distributive
effect, and it can reduce socially desirable spillovers. The social desirability of
its impact on the sellers’ pricing schemes, on the proliferation of resale
markets, and on the preservation of old works is ambiguous. Finally, the
doctrine might marginally improve the privacy of buyers, but this effect is
quite minimal partly because there seems to be a significant mismatch between
the rules of copyright exhaustion and the ways to promote buyers’ privacy.

134

Elsewhere, I have suggested that in the textbook industry, which was discussed in Kirtsaeng,
publishers are likely to serve only the markets in developed countries (e.g., the U.S. market) if the application
of copyright exhaustion forces them to charge a uniform price. Therefore, copyright exhaustion in that case
denies the publisher the entire income from the Thai market, while it also denies Thai students access to
textbooks in English. Rub, supra note 20, at 47. Denying access to students also creates an undesirable
distributive effect, and it significantly reduces spillovers. See infra Part IV.B.
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A. Channeling Distribution Schemes
Copyright exhaustion renders certain kinds of arbitrage legal, which makes
certain price-discrimination practices difficult to sustain.135 However, it does
not completely bar price discrimination. Therefore, in some cases, copyright
exhaustion does not cause sellers to charge a uniform price, but instead it
channels them to use a different kind of price-discrimination scheme, one that
cannot be defeated by resale.
Can this channeling function, by itself, justify the doctrine of copyright
exhaustion? A close examination reveals that in some cases, forcing a seller to
switch from one price-discrimination scheme to another will be socially
desirable. In other cases, it can be socially harmful because it might reduce the
wellbeing of buyers, or, even if buyers are better off, their increase in welfare
might not be enough to offset the decrease in the copyright owner’s welfare.
Overall, there is no reason to assume that the price-discrimination schemes that
sellers will adopt in response to the rules of copyright exhaustion will
typically, or even on average, be socially desirable. In fact, it is probably more
likely to reduce both incentives and the buyers’ welfare.
Take for example the market for movie home viewing. In the European
Union, buyers are not allowed to commercially rent copyrighted movies.136
Movie studios therefore apply a second-degree price-discrimination scheme to
separate libraries and individuals by offering an expensive renting license.137 In
contrast, copyright exhaustion in the United States, by providing each buyer
with a right to commercially rent each copy, makes such a scheme
impractical.138 Therefore, for many years the studios applied a different
second-degree price-discrimination scheme in the United States. The studios
first charged a high price for movies, which allowed only commercial renters
to purchase them, followed by a significant reduction in prices after several
135

See supra Part III.
See supra Part I.B.
137 Mortimer, supra note 133, at 9.
138 A few years ago, as a result of a dispute between some studios and several prominent commercial
libraries including Redbox and Netflix, the traditional distributing companies (that are typically owned by the
studios) stopped distributing films to these libraries. The commercial libraries then started to purchase DVDs
at Wal-Mart and rent them out to their patrons. See Redbox Automated Retail LLC v. Universal City Studios
LLLP, Civil No. 08-766 (RBK), 2009 WL 2588748, at *2 (D. Del. Aug. 17, 2009); Eddins v. Redstone, 35
Cal. Rptr. 3d 863, 871–72 (Ct. App. 2005). This dispute ended with the signing of new licensing arrangements
between the studios and the libraries. See Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property as Price Discrimination:
Implications for Contract, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1367, 1373–74 (1998); Mark A. Lemley, Contracting
Around Liability Rules, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 463, 481–82 (2012); see also infra text accompanying note 264.
136
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weeks, which opened the markets to private purchasers.139 This practice was
not only detrimental to the studios, but it also denied the purchasing public
access to the movies for a long time. The economist Julie Mortimer has
concluded that, even without considering the long-term effects on incentives,
the scheme used in the United States was socially inferior to the one used in
the European Union.140
The facts of Kirtsaeng provide another example. The publisher used to sell
textbooks in English for a low price in developing countries and a high price in
developed countries. The Supreme Court decision in Kirtsaeng, holding that
arbitrage between those markets is legal,141 is likely to make this practice
unsustainable. What will the publisher do now? It can choose a uniform price,
which will lead to a price hike in developing countries and, in practice, will
likely make this a product designated for developed countries.142 Or, it can
engage in an alternative pricing scheme. It can, for example, implement
second-degree price discrimination by selling different versions of the product
in the different countries.143 What are the welfare effects of such a change?
From the seller’s perspective, this is undesirable. Clearly, if the producer’s
surplus would have been higher by selling different versions of the textbook in
each country, then the seller would have chosen to do so even before the
Supreme Court decision in Kirtsaeng. However, can there be a situation in
which the producer surplus decreases but the total surplus still increases?
Under certain conditions, the answer is yes.
For example, it is possible (and quite likely) that the demand for textbooks
in English is lower in Thailand than the demand for translated books.
However, the publisher might prefer not to spend the resources involved in
translating and keeping two versions in print. From the publisher’s perspective,
139 The reality in recent years might have become more complex because changes in demand altered the
preferences of many studios, which then started to release movies to libraries and individuals simultaneously.
See Mortimer, supra note 133. Later, additional changes in demand caused the studios to alter their practices
again and delay distribution to some libraries. See infra note 264.
140 Mortimer, supra note 133.
141 Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013).
142 Rub, supra note 20, at 46.
143 These are just some examples of possible actions by the publishers. Additional actions might include
distributing more books in digital format, see infra Part VI.B, and contractually limiting resale, see infra Part
VI.D. See also Eric Goldman, The Supreme Court’s First Sale Ruling Will Spur Price Competition in the Short
Run,
but
Enjoy
It
While
It
Lasts,
FORBES
(Mar.
20,
2013,
11:59
AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ericgoldman/2013/03/20/the-supreme-courts-first-sale-ruling-will-spur-pricecompetition-in-the-short-run-but-enjoy-it-while-it-lasts/.
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in a pre-Kirtsaeng world, it is more desirable to sell textbooks in English in
Thailand than it is to translate them. However, in a post-Kirtsaeng world, the
publisher might not be able to sell textbooks in English in Thailand because of
the fear of parallel (i.e., gray market) importation.144 In that case, the publisher
might decide that it is better to engage in price discrimination by translating the
book to Thai. It is possible that in such a case the increase in demand in
Thailand will increase the consumers’ surplus of Thai buyers to a point at
which it will outweigh the decrease in the producer’s surplus. In that case, the
total social surplus will increase.145
However, there is no reason to assume that this possibly
efficiency-enhancing channeling is a likely scenario. Three conditions must be
met for this scenario to materialize. First, the increase in the demand for the
new product (e.g., the Thai textbook) cannot be too high. If it is, the producer
will always supply it, even without copyright exhaustion. This is quite
common and can explain why, even before Kirtsaeng, many publishers chose
to translate books to various languages or to otherwise create a variation
between books that are targeted at different markets. Second, the cost of
producing the new product must be low enough, or else the publisher will not
produce it even with copyright exhaustion. And third, there must be a
significant increase in the consumers’ surplus that outweighs the decrease in
the producer’s surplus. If any of these conditions is not met, the limitation that
copyright exhaustion places on price discrimination will not channel the
publisher to choose an alternative price-discrimination scheme that increases
total social surplus by significantly improving access to the product.146
144 Gray market importation, also called parallel market importation, is the practice of importing goods
from one country to another without the authority of the manufacturer. This is typically done to take advantage
of the differences in prices between countries. This is of course what Kirtsaeng did. See supra Part III.C.
145 A numeric example might help illustrate this claim: Let’s assume that the demand curve for a textbook
in English in the United States is given by Q = 100 – P; the demand curve for the same textbook in Thailand is
Q = 30 – P; the demand curve for the same textbook in Thailand translated to Thai is Q = 50 – P; and the cost
of translation $500. In that case, before Kirtsaeng, the producer would sell the books in English in both
markets. The price would be $50 in the United States and $15 in Thailand, which would result in producer’s
surplus of $2,725, consumers’ surplus of $1,362.50, and total surplus of $4,087.50. After Kirtsaeng, this
scheme is unavailable, and so the publisher needs to decide whether and how to serve the Thai market. The
publisher knows that by investing $500 in the translation, it can charge $25 per book in Thailand for a profit of
$625. The publisher will do it. It will continue to sell the textbook in English for $50 and will translate and sell
the textbook in Thai for $25. The total producer’s surplus will be $2,625 (lower than the pre-Kirtsaeng world).
The consumers’ surplus is $1,562.50 (higher than the pre-Kirtsaeng world), and the total surplus will be
$4,187.50, which is higher that the pre-Kirtsaeng world.
146 Note that this post-Kirtsaeng scenario is efficient only from a static equilibrium perspective. This
increase in total surplus is a necessary condition for efficiency but not a sufficient one. As explained in Part
III.A, a sound copyright policy should try to provide high producer’s surplus with high total surplus (i.e., low
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Moreover, there is a real risk that copyright exhaustion will channel the
seller to use second-degree price discrimination that is based on low-quality
products and not high-quality products.147 For example, following Kirtsaeng,
instead of offering high-quality desirable products in developing countries
(e.g., textbooks in Thai), publishers can implement price discrimination by
offering low-quality products in those countries, such as cheap, old versions of
the textbooks. This possibility is socially troubling: On one hand, it is typically
cheap to implement and therefore might be attractive to sellers. On the other
hand, the inferior products, now offered in high-elasticity (i.e., poor) markets,
shrink that market and cause real social harm. Indeed, if this were the reaction
to Kirtsaeng, then there would be a decrease in the welfare of the highelasticity (i.e., poor) buyers, as they will be forced to buy older, and
presumably worse, textbooks.148
There are many examples of price-discrimination schemes that are based on
providing intentionally low-quality products to high-elasticity buyers. Software
companies, for example, intentionally slow down or add artificial limitations to
cheap versions of their software.149 The pricing decision regarding movie home
viewing in the United States also demonstrates this strategy. As discussed,150
studios responded to the limitation imposed by copyright exhaustion by

deadweight loss). Channeling the seller to use an alternative pricing model reduces the producer’s surplus and
thus, to a degree, the incentives to create in the long run, and therefore only a significant increase in total
surplus can make this policy desirable.
147 Fisher, supra note 17, at 11. It should be noted that in some cases, trademark law can also assist in
creating this kind of price-discrimination scheme that is based on selling low-quality goods in poorer
countries. Indeed, “U.S. courts . . . have allowed trademark owners to prevent the importation of gray market
products when they ‘differ materially’ from the goods authorized for sale in the domestic market.” Irene
Calboli, Market Integration and (the Limits of) the First Sale Rule in North American and European
Trademark Law, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1262–63 (2011). However, the prohibition is limited by its
purpose, preventing customers’ confusion, and, therefore, for example, importation is allowed if the materially
different products include a label that states that the importation is not authorized by the trademark owner. Id.
A full analysis of the limitations to gray market importation that is created by trademark law is beyond the
scope of this Article. See id.; Mary LaFrance, Wag the Dog: Using Incidental Intellectual Property Rights to
Block Parallel Imports, 20 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 45, 51–57 (2013).
148 The numeric example, supra note 145, can be expanded to illustrate this point. Let’s assume that the
publisher can, post-Kirtsaeng, publish an older version in Thailand. The administrative costs of keeping two
books in print are $10, and the demand of the older books is Q = 24 – P. Under these conditions, the publisher
will decide to sell the new version for $50 and the old version for $12. The producer’s surplus will be $2,634,
which is higher than the producer’s surplus if the publisher translates the book to Thai (but, of course, lower
than it is pre-Kirtsaeng). The consumers’ surplus will of course shrink (Thai students are now buying old
textbooks) to $1,322, which will result in total surplus of $3,956, lower than the pre-Kirtsaeng surplus.
149 SHAPIRO & VARIAN, supra note 109, at 58–61.
150 See supra notes 138–39 and accompanying text.
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implementing a price-discrimination scheme that offered inferior products—
late home viewing—to high-elasticity private buyers.
The conclusion is that copyright exhaustion can sometimes channel the
copyright owner to adopt a price-discrimination scheme that would not be
chosen otherwise. However, it is doubtful that this will improve social welfare.
In fact, in many cases, it will not even improve static short-term welfare or
even just the welfare of the buyers. Therefore, and because this change reduces
the incentives to create, the channeling function of copyright exhaustion cannot
justify the existence of copyright exhaustion.
B. Spillovers and Distributive Effect
Information wants to be free. The intangible nature of information makes
its flow very difficult to completely control. The indirect benefits that are
attributed to the flow of information are even more difficult to control.
Monetizing those benefits might even be harder.151 Indeed, information spills
over, and in doing so, it creates a positive externality for society—a spillover.
Take, for example a political speech (admittedly, an extreme example).
While “I Have a Dream” is a copyright-protected political speech that is owned
by the estate of Martin Luther King, Jr.,152 under no copyright regime can the
estate be able to capture the full value of this speech and all the positive
externalities that it causes for its listeners. The value of the change that this
speech caused spilled over and was enjoyed by society at large.
In a famous essay, Professors Brett Frischmann and Mark Lemley argue
that those spillovers are a desirable phenomenon that the law should
embrace.153 Indeed, it can be argued that the existence of spillovers is part of a
social contract in which present creators can enjoy the spillovers from past
creators but in return their work should provide spillovers to future creators.154
The law should foster this social contract.155

151 See, e.g., Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure
of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 433–35 (1999); Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. Lemley,
Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2007); R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants to Be Free: Intellectual
Property and the Mythologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995 (2003).
152 Estate of Martin Luther King, Jr., Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 194 F.3d 1211 (11th Cir. 1999).
153 Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 151.
154 See RADIN, supra note 24, at 170–73.
155 Without legal intervention, this social contract might be subject to a collective action problem. While
creators as a group might desire a certain level of spillovers, if each of them is free to control the externalities
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The existence of spillovers has a complex effect on copyright policy. While
spillovers are typically correlated to access, this correlation is not perfect,
especially because some consumers and some ways to use information goods
create more spillovers than others. Therefore, society should be more
concerned with limiting access to certain types of work and certain types of
consumers. For example, political speeches or information goods used in our
educational system typically create more desirable spillovers than pop songs.
Similarly, buyers who use information goods to create other information
goods156 generate more spillovers than buyers that do not. Some of the
doctrines of copyright law, and in particular the fair use defense, seem to
specifically target those spillover-rich works and consumers.157
Copyright exhaustion seems different.158 Unlike the fair use defense, it does
not target spillovers-rich usage—possibly to the contrary. First, as Part III.D
shows, copyright exhaustion typically does not increase total access to the
work. Second, by limiting price discrimination, it denies access for many
individuals with lower willingness to pay and grants access to some buyers,
typically fewer, with a higher willingness to pay. Even if on average the total
welfare is unchanged, it is doubtful if this is a good proxy for spillovers. In
fact, it is possible, and even likely, that denying access to a large group of
low-paying buyers will reduce spillovers more than the increase attributed to a
small group of high-paying buyers.159 If that is the case, then restricting price
discrimination will likely reduce spillovers. For example, if as a result of the
decision in Kirtsaeng, access to English textbooks is denied for many students
in Thailand,160 then it is likely that overall spillovers are reduced, even if some
American students (with higher willingness to pay) are granted access.161

from his or her own work, he or she might try to reduce the spillovers from the work (i.e., monetize use by
others) below their socially efficient level.
156 Creating information goods requires access to existing works. Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39
EMORY L.J. 965, 966 (1990) (“To say that every new work is in some sense based on the works that preceded
it is such a truism that it has long been a cliche [sic] . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
157 See Frischmann & Lemley, supra note 151, at 286–90.
158 Cf. Robinson, supra note 5, at 1454, 1479 (arguing that limitation on fair use might harm the balance
between private and public rights more than restriction on copyright exhaustion).
159 In other words, all else being equal, it is likely that on average a buyer whose willingness to pay is x
creates a spillover that is lower than twice the spillover of a buyer, typically poorer, whose willingness to pay
is x/2. See BRETT M. FRISCHMANN, INFRASTRUCTURE: THE SOCIAL VALUE OF SHARED RESOURCES 72–79
(2012).
160 This scenario is possible. See supra note 134.
161 It is actually quite unlikely that the holding in Kirtsaeng will improve the access to textbooks for
American students. Rub, supra note 20, at 47.
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Third, in sharp contrast with the fair use defense,162 copyright exhaustion
applies equally to all buyers, and it does not target buyers who generate more
externalities, such as future creators.
This discussion points to another significant shortcoming of copyright
exhaustion: the limitation on price discrimination might cause a regressive
socially undesirable distributive impact. As explored in Part III.D, price
discrimination typically improves access for those with high elasticity of
demand and low willingness to pay, who are typically poor, while it
deteriorates the access to buyers with low elasticity of demand and high
willingness to pay, who are typically rich. This transfer of surplus from the rich
to the poor is desirable from a distributive justice perspective as well as from
an efficiency perspective.163
Therefore, it seems that copyright exhaustion creates an undesirable
regressive distributive effect and quite likely reduces the desirable spillovers
from the distribution of copyrighted works.
C. Developing Resale Markets
Some have suggested, sometimes implicitly, that copyright exhaustion is
socially desirable because it facilitates secondary markets.164 For example, in
Kirtsaeng, during oral argument Justice Breyer expressed a somewhat similar
view when he suggested that the publisher’s position might lead to “millions of
Americans who buy Toyotas [that will be unable to] resell [their cars] without
getting the permission of the copyright owner of every item in that car which is
copyrighted.”165 Analogous concerns were later conveyed in Justice Breyer’s
majority opinion in the case.166

162 See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (holding that transformative
use—one that “adds something new”—is entitled to broader fair use protection); Frischmann & Lemley, supra
note 151, at 286–90.
163 See Fisher, supra note 17, at 25, 29–30 (explaining the desirability of price discrimination from a
distributive justice perspective); see Rub, supra note 73, at 100–01 (explaining how the decrease in marginal
utility of wealth means that transference of surplus from rich to the poor, even when total wealth is held
constant, increases total utility and is socially desirable, all else being equal).
164 See, e.g., Reese, supra note 9, at 586.
165 Transcript of Oral Argument at 28–29, Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013)
(No. 11-697), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/11-697.pdf.
166 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1365 (“A geographical interpretation would prevent the resale of, say, a car,
without the permission of the holder of each copyright on each piece of copyrighted automobile software.”).
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Robust secondary markets are typically socially desirable because they
reduce waste and because they give potential purchasers another buying
option.167 Indeed, if, for example, a book can be used for a year before its
physical condition deteriorates and makes it useless, and if each owner would
like to hold on to it for three months, it is socially undesirable to force the first
owner to either keep the book or discard it. This, among other things, will
require the production of additional books instead of saving those production
costs by reusing the existing one.
While the connection between secondary markets and copyright exhaustion
is complex, the former can certainly exist and flourish without the latter. The
concern expressed by the Supreme Court and the view that makes the existence
of secondary markets contingent on broad copyright exhaustion ignores the
power of the market and its ability to serve the needs of buyers and sellers.168
Specifically, because secondary markets increase the value of information
goods in their initial sale, it is in the initial sellers’ interest to provide such a
license and to make sure that secondary markets are innovative and robust.
It is not hard to find examples of sellers who facilitate secondary markets,
even when the law does not mandate them to do so. In fact, Toyota itself
makes the service plan that comes with the purchase of a car transferable,
while it is under no legal obligation to do so. The reason for this choice is not a
secret. Toyota’s website explicitly states that the service plan is transferable
“as an added resale value.”169 Therefore, even if Kirtsaeng would have been
167 In that respect, secondary markets provide a type of price discrimination, because it separate buyers
who want new expensive products from those who prefer used cheaper products. A related argument for the
desirability of secondary markets is that they reduce the costs of information goods and thus improve access to
the goods. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley & Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market
Definition in Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2116 (2012); Reese, supra note 9, at 585–86. The
discussion in Part III.D, as well as the discussion in Part VI.B, suggest that the merits of this claim might be
questionable. While the initial seller of information goods, typically the copyright owner (e.g., publisher or
record company), might lose sales because of secondary markets, this loss would be taken into account in the
determination of the initial price of the good. In other words, sellers that know that their products will be
resold will charge more than sellers who know that their products will not, ceteris paribus. The buyers who
know that they can resell an item will also be willing to pay more. Therefore, resale, in itself, does not always
reduce prices. In addition, because copyright exhaustion does not allow the seller to distinguish (and price
discriminate) between buyers that will resell the product and those that will not, the two groups are charged the
same price, which means that the non-resellers are paying a higher price because they are cross-subsidizing the
resellers.
168 In some respects, this position is a reminder of Ronald Coase’s words: “It was of course the view of
the judges that they were affecting the working of the economic system.” R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social
Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 10 (1960). As Coase demonstrated, however, in many instances that is not the case,
and the market works around the relevant legal rules. See id.
169 FAQ, TOYOTA CERTIFIED, http://www.toyotacertified.com/faq.html (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
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decided differently, it is almost certain that a license to resell would be
provided to every buyer of every car. Otherwise, car sellers would face a sharp
decrease in consumers’ demand and willingness to pay.
Toyota is not alone. In many markets, the scope of the right to resell is
significantly broader than the scope of copyright exhaustion. For example, the
End User License Agreements that Adobe uses, which characterize the
transaction between the company and its consumers as a mere license and not a
sale in order to avoid the full impact of copyright exhaustion,170 contractually
allow the consumer to “permanently transfer” their rights.171
Reselling and renting rights not only increase the value of the item in its
initial sale, but they also allow the copyright owner to make an additional
profit. Thus, while copyright exhaustion does not apply to digital work,172
examples of licensed digital renting services are abundant. Services such as
Netflix streaming, Amazon Instant Video, iTunes, Pandora, Spotify, YouTube
Movies, and many more, are flourishing in recent years and have increased
their share in the markets for information goods. Although every download of
every digital movie and every digital song must be covered by a license, this
does not seem to make this market weak or slow to innovate. More and more
digital service providers now offer new services that expand the ways in which
their products can be used. Amazon’s Kindle for example now allows buyers
of digital books to lend them to others,173 and it is reported that the company
might start allowing Kindle users to resell their books.174
It is important to note that innovative resale and renting markets can also
emerge under the auspices of copyright exhaustion. Netflix’s mail delivery of
DVDs, Redbox’s automated DVD-rental kiosks, eBay, and Craigslist are just a
few examples of such services whose operation depends on the doctrine of
copyright exhaustion. The argument made in this section is more modest.
Neither theory nor practice shows that copyright exhaustion is a required

170 SoftMan Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys. Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001); Adobe Sys. Inc. v.
One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000); see also infra Part VI.E.
171 ADOBE, SOFTWARE LICENSE AGREEMENT § 4.6.2 (2011) http://www.adobe.com/content/dam/Adobe/
en/legal/licenses-terms/pdf/CS6.pdf.
172 See infra Part VI.B.
173 Lend or Borrow Kindle Books, AMAZON, http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?
nodeId=200549320 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015).
174 In January 2013, Amazon secured a patent on the resale of digital content. U.S. Patent No. 8,364,595
(filed May 5, 2009) (issued Jan. 29, 2013).
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condition for having robust or innovative resale markets. This is, therefore, a
weak justification for copyright exhaustion.
D. Preserving Old Works
Can copyright exhaustion be justified as a tool to preserve old copyrighted
works? This section suggests that copyright exhaustion, which was originally
designed primarily to promote competition policy, is an inefficient tool to
promote preservation.
There is little doubt that the preservation of creative works is socially
desirable. Creative works have artistic and historic value. They hold an
important part of our cultural DNA. Some old works “might one day find
renewed commercial, popular, or critical interest” and they will be able to
exploit “[n]ew markets and technologies [that] allow wider dissemination and
exploitation.”175 Other old works might help inspire and promote the creation
of new works.
Although preservation is desirable, there is no consensus as to the best way
to promote it.176 Some have suggested that copyright exhaustion promotes
preservation.177 Two main arguments have been made to link copyright
exhaustion and preservation. First, by improving access to the work and
increasing the quantities of work distributed, copyright exhaustion increases
the chance that older copies will survive over time.178 Second, copyright
exhaustion encourages buyers to resell works instead of discarding them, and
it, in particular, allows libraries, which are experts in preservation, to access
the work.179
The discussion in Part III.D suggests that copyright exhaustion might not
improve access to the work. In fact, by limiting price discrimination and
175

Reese, supra note 9, at 608.
The analysis of this issue goes beyond the scope of copyright exhaustion. Commentators disagree
whether copyright protection in itself promotes or disturbs preservation. Some argue that copyright law
incentivizes copyright owners to preserve their works while others argue that without copyright protection
some market participants will be free to preserve historical works. See, e.g., Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186,
207 (2003) (suggesting the Congress extended copyright protection to, among other things, incentivize the
preservation and restoration of old movies); Paul J. Heald, How Copyright Keeps Works Disappeared, 11 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 829 (2014) (suggesting that works that fall into the public domain are available in
greater numbers).
177 See, e.g., Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 5, at 895 (“[F]irst sale enables preservation of public
access to works that are no longer available from the copyright owner.”); Reese, supra note 9, at 603–10.
178 Reese, supra note 9, at 604–06.
179 Id. at 606–08.
176

RUB GALLEYSPROOFS2

784

2/19/2015 12:32 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:741

possibly by reducing waste, copyright exhaustion likely reduces the quantities
of copies sold and the diversity among buyers, which is expected to harm
long-term preservation.180
Copyright exhaustion can also promote preservation by allowing buyers to
resell their copies and by incentivizing libraries to hold significant
collections.181 However, these benefits are limited. First, copyright owners
have a clear interest in preserving their work.182 Therefore, even without
copyright exhaustion, copyright owners will typically permit actions that
promote the preservation of their work. As explained in Part III.C, it is also
likely that they will permit the resale of their work, as it increases the value of
the work in the initial market. However, because copyright exhaustion bundles
together the right to resell and rent with the ownership of the physical copy, it
cross-subsidizes these actions183 and thus libraries in general. It is difficult to
know whether these benefits outweigh the harm that copyright exhaustion
causes to preservation by reducing quantities.
Even if the net effect of copyright exhaustion on preservation is positive,
this is a weak justification for the doctrine. First, it is extremely overbroad,
because most of the actions it actually fosters, such as the resale of new and
popular books or music or the renting of commercially successful movies, has
little to do with the preservation of old works. Second, it is also extremely too
narrow. Many actions that are crucial for effective preservation of creative
works have nothing to do with copyright exhaustion. For example, the most
significant preservation initiatives in recent years involve mass digitalization.
Those initiatives consist of scanning and saving a massive number of books.
The legality of mass digitalization is questionable and it is currently the subject
of several lawsuits.184 However, the question in these cases is whether libraries
and other commercial entities can scan and save copyrighted books, which
revolves around the exclusive right of reproduction. The exclusive right of
reproduction has nothing to do with the scope of copyright exhaustion. It is
180 There is tension between the two suggested goals of copyright exhaustion: improving preservation and
reducing waste. This Article suggests that copyright exhaustion reduces waste by encouraging buyers to resell
their work. However, it should be conceded that by doing so copyright exhaustion reduces the number of
copies of a work in circulation and thus increases the chances that a work will not be preserved.
181 Reese, supra note 9, at 607.
182 Id. at 608.
183 See supra note 167.
184 See, e.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014) (holding that the mass
digitalization of old books is fair use); Authors Guild, Inc. v. Google Inc., 954 F. Supp. 2d 282 (S.D.N.Y.
2013) (reaching the same conclusion).
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therefore not surprising that the decisions on mass digitalization initiatives
have focused on the fair use defense and not on copyright exhaustion.
Therefore, although preservation is socially important, copyright
exhaustion is an inadequate tool to promote it. It is possible that copyright law
should include specific rules that foster preservation,185 and it is also possible
that the fair use defense already achieves this goal. Whatever the effective
solution to the problem of preservation might be, copyright exhaustion is just
ill-equipped to provide it.
E. Protecting Buyers’ Privacy
Some commentators have justified copyright exhaustion as a tool that
promotes buyers’ privacy.186 This section suggests that while copyright
exhaustion can, in some cases, promote this social goal, it is an inefficient and
ineffective way to do so. It will be shown that copyright exhaustion is, in many
cases, significantly too broad to promote privacy, while in other respects it is
desperately too narrow. Therefore, other legal tools are better tailored to
promote privacy.
There is little doubt that privacy is socially desirable and that there are clear
advantages to giving individuals control over the distribution of some of their
personal information. Copyright exhaustion promotes privacy by fostering a
secondary market in copyrighted works that might be free from the control of
the copyright owner.
Consider, for example, the ability to engage in certain intellectual activities,
such as reading a book, in anonymity.187 This ability is important because the
decision to engage in such activities (e.g., to read a certain book), can
sometimes reveal sensitive private information. For example, the decision to
read a book about dealing with cancer might disclose that there is a reasonable
likelihood that the reader, or maybe his or her close family member, is battling
cancer. More broadly, intellectual privacy—the ability to keep the records of

185 These mechanisms may include, for example, rules that will allow orphan works to fall into the public
domain or rules that would allow libraries to scan old books.
186 See, e.g., Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 5, at 896 (“Under the doctrine, consumers can transfer
works without permission of the copyright holder, thereby allowing them to do so privately and
anonymously.”).
187 See generally Julie E. Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright
Management” in Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996) (discussing the need to allow users to consume
digital content without being subject to privacy-invasive copyright management systems).
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one’s intellectual activities private and confidential—is important for
promoting the First Amendment values of free thought and expression.188
Therefore, there is real social value in allowing individuals to keep their
reading lists, as well as other records of intellectual consumption, to
themselves.
Copyright exhaustion promotes these goals. For example, it allows an
individual battling cancer to walk into a used-book store and buy a book
without having any record of that action. Without copyright exhaustion, such a
transaction would have to be authorized by the copyright owner, which can
compromise the action’s otherwise private nature. This benefit is especially
salient in the digital world. Without copyright exhaustion, every copy of a
copyrighted work will likely be sold in the primary market by copyright
owners or their distributors,189 which would give copyright owners access to
the identity of all the buyers of their works.
While this argument has merit, it is also overstated. As explained in
Part III.C, resale markets can and do exist even without copyright exhaustion.
It was explained that in many cases, especially when it comes to physical (and
not digital) copies, even without copyright exhaustion, the initial seller will
allow future resale to increase the price paid in the initial transaction.190 While
it is possible that without copyright exhaustion, in some cases, the copyright
owner might not grant an ex ante license to resell and will require further
negotiation and more information, this is probably the exception to the rule.
Moreover, even when the initial seller does not permit resale (or other forms of
transferability), the seller might still not keep track of the identity of its
buyers.191 Indeed, market pressure is expected to somewhat curtail the initial
188

See Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008).
As further explained in Part VI.B, while in the physical world, even without copyright exhaustion,
most copyright owners would allow buyers to resell the work, this is less likely to happen in the digital world.
Because the production of digital copies is almost costless, the benefits of reusing old copies are negligible as
the copyright owner can sell a “new copy” to any new buyer.
190 Moreover, as further explored in Part V, the seller will typically prefer to include such a license ex
ante, in the initial sale, and not ex post, on the eve of the resale transaction, because ex post negotiation is
expensive. See also infra note 208.
191 Indeed, while some sellers might find it valuable to know the identity of their buyers (in the primary
and secondary markets), anonymous consumption can sometime be (and currently is) allowed even when
transferability is not. For example, many prominent online eBook sellers, including Amazon and eBooks.com,
while not allowing transferability of eBooks, do not verify the identity of a purchaser as a condition for a sale.
And while the identity might be known in many cases because most purchasers probably pay with their credit
cards, those who pay with other payment methods, such as gift cards or prepaid cards, can typically buy digital
books in anonymity. Similarly, libraries routinely purchase licenses that allow them to let their patrons read
189
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sellers’ attempts to collect information regarding buyers’ identities, especially
when the work is of sensitive nature. Thus, authors and distributors of books
on battling cancer will likely be encouraged to allow anonymous purchase, as
it will improve their sales.
More importantly, even if one believes that preserving anonymity in those
cases in which the initial sellers’ policies will endanger it is a vital social goal,
this is a weak justification for copyright exhaustion. From a privacy
perspective, copyright exhaustion is significantly too broad because most
actions that are shielded by copyright exhaustion—such as commercial
importation, resale of popular music CDs, or yard sales—have little to do with
privacy concerns.
In other respects, from a privacy perspective, copyright exhaustion is too
narrow because even when it does improve privacy, such an improvement is
overall minimal. Indeed, copyright exhaustion only marginally promotes
intellectual privacy. Much of our intellectual activities, such as our phone
conversations or our online search terms—have little to do with copyright
policy. Thus, while copyright scholars raise concerns regarding the privacy of
the records of our intellectual activities and suggest that it is being threatened
in recent years,192 copyright exhaustion does little to elevate these concerns.
Copyright exhaustion might make it somewhat more difficult for Amazon to
know what books users read but it does not prevent Google from collecting
that information and much more.193 From a privacy perspective there is no real
electronic books without reporting the identity of those readers to the publisher. See infra text accompanying
note 253.
192 See, e.g., Richards, supra note 188, at 434–36 (explaining the importance of guarding information
regarding online activity because “[i]ntellectual records—such as lists of Web sites visited, books owned, or
terms entered into a search engine—are in a very real sense a partial transcript of the operation of a human
mind”).
193 In practice, it is not obvious that even if digital copies were subject to the rules of copyright
exhaustion, which currently they are not, see Part VI.B, Amazon and other commercial distributors would be
significantly restricted in their ability to monitor readership. As further discussed in Part VI.B, digital copies
are typically distributed with digital rights management systems that might collect information about the users’
activities. Even if these right management systems are required to allow transferability (if and when the rules
of exhaustion apply to digital content) it is unclear that they will be precluded from recording these activity.
Copyright exhaustion in itself does not prevent data collection. Second, digital files, in many cases, are used
through communication devices that can collect information on the users’ readership. Thus, even if eBooks
would have been subject to the rules of exhaustion, privacy might not improve if most buyers, including in the
secondary market, use Amazon’s Kindle to read eBooks. Finally, even when copyright exhaustion denies some
information from the initial distributor, it does not prevent the resellers from collecting that information. This
might make the utility of exhaustion as a privacy enhancing rule questionable, especially when initial sellers
play a dominant role in the facilitation of secondary markets, as Amazon does with respect to the resale of
used physical books.
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reason for this distinction. It is therefore not surprising that privacy scholars
suggest solutions to the problem of intellectual privacy and anonymous reading
that have nothing to do with copyright exhaustion.194
Indeed, while copyright exhaustion can limit some flows of private
information, it seems that those benefits are quite peripheral. Copyright
exhaustion was designed to promote goals that have little to do with privacy
(or, more broadly, with the flow of information in general), and it is thus not
surprising that it is ill-equipped to effectively or significantly protect our
intellectual privacy. Therefore, the problem of privacy, especially in the digital
world, should be addressed by other, better tailored, legal mechanisms.
V. THE BENEFITS OF COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION: REDUCING TRANSACTION
COSTS
The previous Parts of this Article questioned many of the potential
justifications for the copyright exhaustion doctrine. Part II shows that due to
developments in economics and in the law, the historic theoretical foundations
of the doctrine no longer support it. Parts III and IV suggest that in a world
with no information costs, in which buyers can, without incurring any costs,
know the attributes of the products they purchase, the justifications for
copyright exhaustion are weak. The doctrine likely decreases the incentives to
create; does not increase access to the work; has marginal desirable effect on
the privacy of buyers; and, because it specifically harms poor buyers, is likely
to have an undesirable distributive impact, and harms spillovers.
However, this no-information-costs world is not the world we are living
in.195 This Part relaxes the assumption of no information costs and, by doing
so, it reveals the role of copyright exhaustion as an information-costs-reduction
194 See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 187, at 1031–34 (suggesting that anonymous reading should be secured by
governmental regulation of copyright management systems); Richards, supra note 188, at 437 (arguing the
intellectual privacy should be protected vis-à-vis online service providers by new laws that would impose
certain obligations regarding the retention and management of users’ information as well as by social norms
that will cultivate privacy).
195 Some have attributed to Coase the practice of ignoring transaction costs. This is sometimes referred to
as a “Coasian world.” Historically, nothing of course can be further from the truth. Coase’s lifelong work shed
light on the effects of transaction costs. Exploring a no-transaction-costs hypothetical, as done by Coase and as
done in the previous Part of this Article, only to later relax that assumption, is designed to shed light on the
role of transaction costs and not to ignore them. See also Brett M. Frischmann & Alain Marciano,
Understanding the Problem of Social Cost (Cardozo Legal Studies Research Paper No. 435, 2014), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2445819 (explaining how Coase was often
misunderstood).
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norm.196 In other words, this Part suggests that the main benefit and
justification for copyright exhaustion should be the reduction of information
costs. Section A discusses the significance of information costs and how
copyright exhaustion affects them. Section B suggests that copyright markets
might experience high information-costs problems but that some participants in
this market, namely professional repeat players, are significantly less likely to
be significantly harmed by these costs. The next Part, Part VI, shows how
these observations can help shape the scope of copyright exhaustion.
A. Copyright Exhaustion and Information Costs
Previous Parts of this Article, and in particular Part IV.C, suggest that when
buyers determine the value of a copyrighted good, they take into account,
among other things, their legal rights to the purchased items, and in particular
whether they will be allowed to resell or rent these items in the future. The
doctrine of copyright exhaustion standardizes this information.197 In other
words, under this doctrine, copyrighted products can be resold and rented, and
buyers in the market can determine the value they attach to these products with
that information in mind.198
Put differently, without copyright exhaustion, buyers would need to spend
resources investigating whether they would be allowed to resell and rent a
work, or else it would be difficult to assess the value of the copyrighted
products. The resources that are spent in this inquiry—a form of information
costs—are not earned by anyone. They are a social waste. Minimizing them is
therefore socially desirable.
Moreover, when information costs are high, buyers might choose not to
spend them at all and just buy the product “as is.” This is troubling. If buyers
do not know if the copyrighted products they are buying can be transferred
(i.e., resold and rented), their purchasing decisions cannot incentivize the

196

See, e.g., Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 7, at 2082; Van Houweling, supra note 5.
Others have explored how standardization of property arrangements can reduce information cost. See,
e.g., Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Numerus
Clausus Principle, 110 YALE. L.J. 1, 31–33 (2000) (suggesting that certain property law doctrines such as the
numerus clausus principle can be explained by the need to reduce information costs by standardization).
198 This standardization is partial because even under copyright exhaustion the market is mixed because
the resale of items that were not initially legally sold, such as pirated items, is illegal. This fact was practically
ignored during the Kirtsaeng litigation and it was not mentioned in the decision. It is possible that the low
volume of pirated goods in the market makes it less severe.
197
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sellers to offer resale rights.199 This might encourage the sellers to sell inferior
products (i.e., products that do not allow resale) for a price that is suitable for
superior goods (i.e., products that allow resale).200
In extreme cases, when a market includes goods of varying quality that the
buyers cannot easily tell apart, a phenomenon known as “the market for
lemons” might emerge.201 Buyers in this market will price products based on
their expected (average) value. This average price will typically be too low for
sellers of high-quality goods but attractive for sellers of low-quality goods.
Therefore, some high-quality sellers will leave the market, and more lowquality sellers will join it. This, in turn, will decrease the willingness to pay
even further, which will cause more high-quality sellers to leave the market
and so on. In such a case, the inability to observe the products’ quality destroys
the market for high-quality goods.
This phenomenon is troubling in any market,202 but it is especially
troubling in the context of resale markets. As Part IV.C explains, resale rights
prevent waste, and therefore limiting resale rights seems especially undesirable
(to sellers as well as buyers and to society at large). Indeed, the right to resell
information goods should typically be included in the bundle of rights that is
transferred upon the initial sale of these goods.203 However, without copyright
exhaustion, once a market for lemons emerges there is a strong incentive to
provide low-quality goods: in this case, copyrighted items that cannot be
resold.
Similar arguments were raised before the Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng.
Kirtsaeng and his amici described a series of undesirable scenarios that would
materialize if he were to lose the case. During litigation, these scenarios were

199

Cf. supra Part IV.C (suggesting that it is in the sellers’ best interest to offer product that can be resold
because this will increase prices in the initial sale).
200 This is part of a broader problem. It can be argued that whenever buyers cannot verify a certain
important attribution with respect to items they consider purchasing, seller will not have enough incentive to
offer efficient products. See infra note 277 and accompanying text for a discussion on this problem in the
context of standard-form agreements.
201 See Akerlof, supra note 19.
202 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of
Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 673–74 (1984) (discussing the phenomenon in the context of securities law);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV. 211, 244 (1995)
(discussing the phenomenon in the context of boilerplate provisions in contract law); Carol M. Rose, The
Several Futures of Property: Of Cyberspace and Folk Tales, Emission Trades and Ecosystems, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 129, 149 (1998) (discussing the phenomenon in the context of regulation of cyberspace).
203 Van Houweling, supra note 73, at 562.
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referred to as “the parade of horribles.” While some of those “horribles” are
questionable,204 the publisher’s position was indeed problematic from an
information-costs perspective. Its position, adopted by the dissenting justices,
was that the unauthorized importation, as well as the unauthorized domestic
resale of copyright protected items manufactured abroad, constitutes copyright
infringement. However, all the parties to this litigation agreed that
unauthorized importation as well as unauthorized resale of copyright-protected
items manufactured in the United States are perfectly legal.205
Adopting the publisher’s position would have resulted in domestic resale
markets that include two types of products: products that can be legally resold
and products the resale of which triggers liability for copyright infringement.
Those infringing sellers would have been subject to extensive remedies,
including statutory damages,206 and the facilitators of those markets (e.g.,
eBay) would have faced potential liability for indirect copyright
infringement.207
As discussed above, markets that consist of products of varying quality in
which buyers cannot cheaply observe the quality can be unstable and can
inefficiently shrink. In this case, this might have created a chilling effect not
only on secondary markets but also on initial markets. Indeed, initial markets
might shrink because buyers may either assume that they will not be able to
resell items they purchase, which will reduce their willingness to pay, or they
will waste resources in guaranteeing that resale rights will be available to them.
This problem is, of course, broader than the issue that was before the
Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng. Without copyright exhaustion, buyers will need a
license from the copyright owner to resell copyright-protected goods. Thus,
resale rights, which are generally efficient as they eliminate waste, will not be
provided by law by default. Getting out of this inefficient default rule will
require broad licensing schemes, which is wasteful from an information-costs
perspective.208 Those licensing schemes might create many idiosyncratic
204

See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 165–69; infra note 233.
This is the holding of Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc., 523 U.S.
135 (1998). No party in Kirtsaeng asked the Court to reconsider the Quality King precedent. See also infra
Part VI.A.
206 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2012).
207 See infra note 235 and accompanying text.
208 A funny and effective example of such a negotiation was presented in a segment on The Colbert
Report in which Stephen Colbert and Elvis Costello agreed, after several minutes of negotiation, that if Colbert
sells an old Costello record for $1 in a garage sale, he would pay Costello 14 cents and a dented muffin tin.
The sketch was enacted as part of the show’s “Judge, Jury & Executioner” series. The Colbert Report: Jake
205
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arrangements, and choosing among them will be expensive. Moreover, as
Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith explained, idiosyncratic
arrangements that run with the property create an externality for all others who
deal in the same kind of property, as they need to inquire into the nature of
their interests too.209 Indeed, law and economics scholars have long argued that
default rules should typically mimic the arrangement that is the most efficient
to most parties,210 and that providing default rules that invite many parties to
contract around them is socially undesirable.211 Thus, the need to minimize
contracting and reduce information costs can justify a norm that allows buyers
of copyrighted goods to resell those copies.
B. Identifying High-Information-Cost Scenarios
Section A suggests that copyright exhaustion can reduce information costs.
Therefore, eliminating copyright exhaustion might be disadvantageous because
high information costs are socially wasteful and can lead to undesirable
consequences. This section complements the discussion in section A by
arguing that in the market for copyrighted goods information costs are
typically high, but situations in which the market can mitigate them can be
identified. This discussion will be the base for several normative implications
that are explored in Part VI.

Tapper
(Comedy
Central
television
broadcast
Nov.
26,
2012),
available
at
http://thecolbertreport.cc.com/videos/242ato/judge--jury---executioner---copyright-law. This is an example of
high transaction costs in the secondary market for copyrighted goods. This Part focuses on information costs in
the primary market because, to a large degree, it sees the problem of transaction costs in the secondary market
as a subset of the problem of information costs in the primary market. Part IV.C suggests that even without the
doctrine of copyright exhaustion, absent any information costs, many, possibly most, copyrighted goods will
be offered with the future right to transfer the goods and therefore transaction costs in the secondary markets
will be, to a large degree, eliminated too.
209 Merrill & Smith, supra note 197, at 31–33. Robinson disagrees with Merrill and Smith, and suggests
that as the idiosyncratic arrangements become more common, buyers will expect them and will require the
sellers to secure their rights. Robinson, supra note 5, at 1487. While I agree that in some cases Robinson is
correct, see supra Part III.C, Robinson seems to minimize the information costs of this situation, and
especially, as further explained in Part V.B, the disproportionate effect it will have on low-volume
transactions.
210 Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default
Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 93 (1989) (“Lawmakers can minimize the costs of contracting by choosing the default
that most parties would have wanted.”).
211 In fact, in some cases default rules that are inefficient for many contracting parties might result in real
social harm because they tend to be sticky and cause some parties to be stuck with arrangements that would
not have been chosen in the absence of those default rules. See Omri Ben-Shahar & John A.E. Pottow, On the
Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651 (2006).
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Several common characteristics of the markets for copyrighted goods are
expected to increase information costs—the cost of figuring out whether a
buyer will be able to resell a copyrighted good—at least when copyright
exhaustion is inapplicable. The main attribute that makes information costs
significant in the context of copyrighted goods is that those goods are typically
cheap and that they frequently and rapidly change hands.212 Indeed,
information costs are less troubling the more expensive the product
purchased.213 The reason is that information costs do not closely correlate to
the value of the item purchased. Thus, if Kirtsaeng would have been decided
differently, the absolute cost of exploring the buyers’ rights with respect to a
$1 used music CD would have been comparable to the cost of exploring the
rights with respect to a $100,000 painting, but their effects would be different.
A few dollars in information costs might not seriously affect the purchase of an
expensive painting, but similar expenses would have a real chilling effect on
the markets for cheap CDs.214
In some cases, there are mechanisms that can mitigate the information costs
problem. For example, information costs can be mitigated by a registry of
rights, which will provide notice to buyers.215 However, while registration
212 Christina M. Mulligan, The Cost of Personal Property Servitudes: Lessons for the Internet of Things
11–15 (Brooklyn Law Sch., Legal Studies Paper No. 400, 2014), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2465651 (last modified Dec. 19, 2014).
213 Id.; Robinson, supra note 5, at 1486; Van Houweling, supra note 5, at 914–15.
214 This is somewhat similar to the process of clearing title, which is common in real estate transactions.
While this process is not cheap in absolute terms, those costs are negligible compared to the value of a typical
real estate transaction. Robinson also compared the process of buying real estate that is subject to a servitude
to the process of buying a copyrighted works subject to a restriction, Robinson, supra note 5, at 1491, but he
might not have fully appreciated the difference between adding some information costs to a large real estate
transaction and to a small transaction over cheap copies.
215 See Rub, supra note 73, at 75–76 (discussing the role of registration in reducing information costs);
Van Houweling, supra note 5 (same). Currently, in the United States, a copyright can be voluntarily registered
with the U.S. Copyright Office, but this registration encompasses only the interests in the intangible work, not
in the physical copies thereof. Thus, the registry discussed in this section is different than the registry currently
in place.
It can be argued that registering rights in copies might be difficult. Christina Mulligan, for example,
argued that transaction costs might be higher with respect to items that are small, movable, and fungible, such
as most copies of copyrighted work. Mulligan, supra note 212, at 9–11. While this is probably a valid
observation, it might be a real concern only to the extent that copies will vary in the rights they confer on their
possessor. Thus, if two (or more) otherwise identical copies of HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE
confer different rights on their possessors then effectively registering and tracing these legal rights might be
difficult. A registry will need to have an entry for each copy and each buyer will need to be able to identify his
or her own copy in that registry. However, if the rights do not vary among copies, this problem is significantly
mitigated. Thus, if all the copies of HARRY POTTER AND THE SORCERER’S STONE include the same limitation
on the possessors’ rights, then registering this limitation and, from the buyers’ perspective, locating and
learning about this limitation will be significantly easier. Modern digital technology can reduce the costs of
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might mitigate the problem in some cases, it is not a panacea for the
information costs problem in the context of copyrighted goods because, like
most notice systems, it is not costless to implement. It is therefore unlikely that
registration can be used to efficiently verify rights in every CD or book sold in
the marketplace.216
While high information costs might be significant in the markets for
information goods, some market participants can handle them better than
others and significantly reduce them. In this respect, a distinction should be
made between professionals and laymen. Professional repeat players not only
engage in large volume transactions, but they can develop expertise in ways to
cheaply investigate the attributes of products they regularly purchase. Indeed,
it is significantly less likely that professionals will be unfamiliar with their
legal rights. Therefore, copyright exhaustion might have only marginal benefits
in reducing the information costs of professionals. Interestingly, in all the
high-profile copyright-exhaustion decisions from recent years, the alleged
copyright infringers were professionals in the sense that they were sued for
repeated acts of alleged infringement on a large scale.217 Information costs did
not play a role in any of those cases.

registration even further. Rub, supra note 73, at 76. Of course, as discussed in this section, even if effective
registration is feasible, requiring the buyers of cheap and frequently transferable products to explore a registry
might be socially undesirable from an information-costs perspective.
216 Cf. Hovenkamp, supra note 9, at 516–21 (placing a significant weight on registration as a way to
provide notice and reduce information costs); Mark R. Patterson, Must Licenses Be Contracts? Consent and
Notice in Intellectual Property, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 105, 147–52 (2012) (discussing the limited role of
notice in the enforcement of licenses on downstream buyers); Robinson, supra note 5, at 1486–87 (discussing
the need to require sellers to give notice to buyers).
217 Supap Kirtsaeng made a small fortune from selling textbooks that he knew had a notice, which stated
they were not to be sold in the United States. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1356
(2013). His business model was based on selling copyrighted goods in the United States that the copyright
owner wanted to be left out of that market. Similarly, Timothy Vernor, who unsuccessfully raised copyright
exhaustion in Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., 621 F.3d 1102 (9th Cir. 2010), SoftMan, which successfully raised this
claim in SoftMan Products Co. v. Adobe Systems Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001), and One Stop
Micro, which failed in making a very similar argument in Adobe Systems Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F.
Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000), were all engaged in massive sales of copyrighted software online. Costco, the
defendant in Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 562 U.S. 40 (2010) (per curiam) (mem.), is the second
largest retailer in the United States. Quality King Distributors, which successfully raised copyright exhaustion
when sued in Quality King Distributors, Inc. v. L’anza Research International, Inc., 523 U.S. 135 (1998), is a
company that engaged in importation to the United States on a large scale for over fifty years. Troy Augusto,
who successfully relied on copyright exhaustion in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir.
2011), regularly purchased and distributed CDs that included a promotion statement prohibiting resale, and
ReDigi, whose copyright exhaustion defense was denied in Capitol Records, LLC v. ReDigi Inc., 934 F. Supp.
2d 640 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), operated a large online digital record store. It is of course possible that other cases,
and in particular cases that settled prior to adjudication, involved laypersons.
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The conclusion is that in many cases, copyright exhaustion can be justified
as a tool to reduce information costs. This is especially true when the rules of
the exhaustion doctrine make it unnecessary for laypersons to inquire whether
they will be able to resell and lend copyrighted goods they consider buying. In
other cases, information costs are expected to be less significant, and so the
justification for copyright exhaustion is weaker. The next Part of this Article
suggests that by comparing these benefits with the costs of copyright
exhaustion, the scope of copyright exhaustion can be shaped.
VI. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS: REBALANCING COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION
The previous Parts explore the complex economic effects of copyright
exhaustion. This doctrine, inter alia, makes price discrimination more difficult,
which in turn typically reduces the incentives to create without increasing the
access to the work and brings about an undesirable distributive effect. The
doctrine might also reduce the spillovers from the distribution of creative
works. At the same time, the doctrine reduces information costs, and therefore,
when these costs are expected to be high, the doctrine might be socially
desirable.
The significance of each of those factors—incentives and information
costs, and to a lesser degree, access, distributive impact, and spillovers—and
the other considerations that were explored throughout this Article should
shape the scope of the copyright-exhaustion doctrine. In other words, a sound
copyright policy will dictate a narrow scope to the doctrine in those cases in
which it creates significant harm to socially desirable goals, such as
incentivizing creation, all else being equal. Similarly, it will be advisable to
expand the scope for copyright exhaustion when its benefits, such as reducing
information costs, are significant. Therefore, the effects of copyright
exhaustion on these factors should dictate its scope.
This Part shows how this balanced framework can tackle the core questions
that collectively shape the scope of copyright exhaustion.218 This Part
addresses those five core questions: (1) whether the copyright exhaustion
218 The approach taken in this Part tries to identify situations in which, on average, copyright exhaustion
should be broader or narrower than it currently is. A possible different approach would leave this
determination to a flexible, case-by-case judicial determination. This is the approach with respect to the
enforcement of servitudes on chattels, restraints on alienation of property, and vertical restraints in general. See
supra Part II. This approach, while not without merits, leads to uncertainty, which seems especially harmful in
the dynamic market of information goods. Indeed, it seems socially undesirable to make transactions over
information goods, which are extremely frequent in the digital world, subject to ex post judicial scrutiny.
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doctrine should apply to importation in the same way that it should be applied
to domestic resale, (2) whether it should apply to digital distribution of
copyrighted materials, (3) whether it should apply to commercial renting,
(4) whether a copyright owner might have a contractual cause of action when
copyright liability is excluded by copyright exhaustion, and (5) whether the
scope of the doctrine should be dictated by an attempt to characterize certain
transaction as a mere license instead of a sale. These questions—which, in
recent years, have been the subject of a heated debate in litigation and in
academic writing—can be addressed by the balanced approach suggested by
this Article.219
A. Importation and Domestic Resale
It is well settled that copyright exhaustion limits copyright owners’ ability
to control domestic redistribution of their works. However, it is not clear
whether copyright exhaustion should limit the ability of copyright owners to
control international importation of copyrighted goods into the United States.
This debate concerns the ambiguous language of the Copyright Act as well as
questions on the desirable control that copyright owners should exercise from a
copyright policy perspective.220
It is hard to conclusively know whether a copyright owner can control
importation of copyrighted goods into the United States by just examining the
relevant provisions of the Copyright Act. At least three sections of the
Copyright Act are at play here: Section 106(3) that stipulates the exclusive
right of distribution,221 Section 602(a)(1) that states the copyright owner’s
exclusive right over importation,222 and Section 109(a) that codifies the
copyright exhaustion doctrine.223 The text of the Copyright Act does not clarify
how these three provisions relate to one another and, in particular, whether

219 These questions are complex, and the discussion in this Part cannot address every argument that was
raised in connection to each one of them. This Part therefore outlines the main arguments and considerations
that should be taken into account when designing full solutions to these questions.
220 Other countries debate similar questions, and it is the subject of international negotiation over
copyright. See, e.g., GHOSH, supra note 33; Kaminski, supra note 4.
221 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2012) (“[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights . . . to
distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public . . . .”).
222 Id. § 602(a)(1) (“Importation into the United States, without the authority of the owner of copyright
under this title, of copies . . . of a work that have been acquired outside the United States is an infringement of
the exclusive right to distribute copies . . . under section 106 . . . .”).
223 Id. § 109(a) (“[T]he owner of a particular copy . . . lawfully made under this title . . . is entitled,
without the authority of the copyright owner, to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy . . . .”).
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Section 109(a) (copyright exhaustion) limits just Section 106(3) (domestic
distribution) or also Section 602(a)(1) (importation).224
In Quality King, the Supreme Court unanimously resolved this difficulty by
holding that copyright exhaustion, as codified in Section 109(a), shields not
just domestic distribution but also importation.225 Recently, in her concurring
opinion in Kirtsaeng, Justice Kagan implicitly criticized this holding.226
The analysis in the previous Parts provides strong support for Justice
Kagan’s position. Indeed, while the Court in Quality King noted that
prohibiting unlicensed importation “would merely inhibit access to ideas

224 The language of the relevant sections of the Copyright Act is ambiguous, and it can entertain several
different ways to reconcile the copyright exhaustion doctrine in Section 109(a) with the rights of importation
in Section 602(a)(1). For example, it can be argued that when Section 602(a)(1) states that unauthorized
importation infringes on “the right to distribute,” it incorporates the limitations on that right of distribution
and, in particular, the copyright-exhaustion doctrine. Alternatively, it can be argued that because Section
109(a) states that an owner of a copy is entitled “to sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy”
but says nothing about importation, then it does not restrict Section 602(a)(1). One can find additional support
for both interpretations in various parts of the Copyright Act as well in its legislative history. See generally
L’anza Research Int’l, Inc. v. Quality King Distribs., Inc., 98 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 1996) (explaining why
Section 109(a) does not limit Section 602(a)(1)), rev’d, 523 U.S. 135 (1998); Sebastian Int’l, Inc. v. Consumer
Contacts (PTY) Ltd., 847 F.2d 1093 (3d Cir. 1988) (explaining why Section 109(a) limits Section 602(a)(1)).
This Article focuses on the desirable scope, from a copyright policy perspective, of the
copyright-exhaustion doctrine, and therefore it does not explore all the arguments for one statutory
interpretation over another. Suffice to say that the Copyright Act itself is ambiguous enough to support the
various conclusions that courts have read into these provisions throughout the years.
225 Quality King, however, left one question unanswered: whether copyright exhaustion applies to items
that were both manufactured and first sold abroad and later imported, without the copyright owner’s authority,
to the United States. 523 U.S. 135. In Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., the Court answered this question
and held that copyright exhaustion applies in this situation. 133 S. Ct. 1351 (2013). Therefore, under current
precedent, copyright exhaustion applies to importation regardless of the location of manufacturing or first sale.
See also supra note 40.
226 Kirtsaeng, 133 S. Ct. at 1372–73 (Kagan, J., concurring). Justice Kagan stated that she thought that the
publisher “may have a point” when suggesting that Section 602(a)(1)’s “rightful function [is] enabling
copyright holders to segment international markets” and therefore this “gives [her] pause about Quality King’s
holding that the first-sale doctrine limits the importation ban’s scope.” Id. at 1373. Justice Kagan explained
that the Copyright Act allows interpretation different from the one the Court adopted in Quality King. She also
conceded that the combined effect of the decisions in Quality King and Kirtsaeng limits Section 602(a)(1) “to
a fairly esoteric set of applications” but observed that “if Congress views the shrinking of § 602(a)(1) as a
problem, it should recognize Quality King—not [Kirtsaeng]—as the culprit.” Id. at 1372. She also suggested
that “allowing the copyright owner to restrict imports irrespective of the first-sale doctrine—i.e., reversing
Quality King—would yield a far more sensible scheme of market segmentation.” Id. at 1373 n.2.
It therefore seems that Justice Kagan agreed with the publisher that Congress tried to foster
international price discrimination, and she implicitly suggests that the Court was wrong in holding, in Quality
King, that copyright exhaustion applies to importation. Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion was joined by
Justice Alito. Neither Justice Kagan nor Justice Alito was a member of the Court in 1998 when Quality King
was decided.
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without any countervailing benefit,”227 this Article suggests that the reality is
quite different and more complex. Indeed, prohibiting unlicensed importation
might not inhibit access to copyrighted goods228 and might actually provide a
“countervailing benefit.”
By using the framework developed in the previous parts of this Article, a
more careful policy analysis can be offered. Such an analysis would balance
the benefits and harms from extending copyright exhaustion to importation and
compare it to the benefits and harms from the domestic implementation of this
doctrine. As analyzed below, this balanced approach leads to the same
conclusions implied by Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion in Kirtsaeng:
domestic resale and importation should be treated differently.
For several reasons, it seems desirable to allow a copyright owner to
control importation. First, the impact on incentives must be considered. As Part
III shows, if copyright exhaustion applies to importation, international price
discrimination, which is extremely lucrative to copyright owners because of
the significant global differences in willingness to pay, becomes more difficult.
This will decrease, possibly significantly, the incentives to create.229 Second,
the effect on access should be considered. Part III demonstrates that
227 Quality King, 523 U.S. at 151 (quoting Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S.
417, 450–51 (1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
228 While the statement quoted from Quality King considered limitation on “access to ideas,” this was
probably a mistake. Ideas are not protected by copyright, 17 U.S.C. § 102(b), and therefore the scope of
copyright exhaustion should not materially affect access to ideas. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the
Court was referring to the possible limitation on access to copyrighted goods.
229 The need to incentivize the creation of information goods should distinguish copyright owners from
other sellers. Indeed, the law grants market power to copyright owners in order to incentivize creation.
Importation rights are part of that scheme. With most other products, there is no economic justification to grant
market power by law. See Guy A. Rub, The Unconvincing Case for Resale Royalties, 124 YALE L.J. F. 1, 3–5
(2014). Therefore, while this Article suggests that copyright owners should be granted an exclusive right over
importation, the analysis does not justify granting similar rights to producers of other goods.
Producers should also not be allowed to use the importation rights of copyright owners to enforce price
discrimination on products that are not protected by copyright. Unfortunately, in two of the recent Supreme
Court cases dealing with copyright exhaustion, producers have tried to do so. In Quality King, the plaintiff
manufactured shampoo and argued that the label on the bottle is protected by copyright, and therefore the
bottles could not be imported. 523 U.S. at 138–140. In Costco Wholesale Corp. v. Omega, S.A., 562 U.S. 40
(2010) (per curiam) (mem.), the plaintiff manufactured watches that were not protected by copyright or
patents. It argued that a tiny logo on the back of the watch was protected by copyright, and thus the watches
could not be imported to the United States. See Omega S.A. v. Costco Wholesale Corp., —F.3d—, 2015 WL
235479, at *4 (9th Cir. 2015) (Wardlaw, J., concurring) (discussing the Omega “Globe Design”). Regardless
of the scope of copyright exhaustion, importing L’anza shampoo bottles or Omega watches should not trigger
liability for copyright infringement, and those actions should be safeguarded by other doctrines in copyright
law such as fair use, copyright misuse, and the de minimis defense. See id. at *6–12 (refusing to enforce
Omega’s copyright in the globe design because it constitute copyright misuse).
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eliminating price discrimination does not generally increase access to
copyrighted goods.230 In fact, when it comes to importation, there is a high
likelihood that price discrimination improves access because of the significant
differences in willingness to pay across markets. When these differences are
significant, some high-elasticity markets, in this case markets in third-world
countries, can typically be served only if a price-discrimination scheme is
implemented.231 Therefore, eliminating price discrimination in those cases
typically reduces overall access.
Third, the distributive impact and the effect on spillovers should be
evaluated. As explained in Part IV.B, there is no reason to assume that
geographic price discrimination targets creators or other consumers or usages
generating significant positive externalities. Therefore, as explained in
Part IV.B, because unrestricted, unauthorized importation can lead to reduced
quantities, it might also reduce spillovers. It was also explained that
eliminating price discrimination can be especially harmful to poor buyers—in
this case buyers in developing countries—which is undesirable from both
utilitarian and distributive justice perspectives.
Fourth, the possible reduction in information costs should be measured. It
seems that requiring a license to import copyrighted goods is expected to have
only a modest effect on information costs. Importation is typically handled in
large quantities by professionals, who, as analyzed in Part V.B, usually face
low information costs.
Small-scale private importation, which can be adversely affected by
allowing the copyright owner to control importation, is not only less common,
but, more importantly, it can also be (and to a large degree currently is)
covered by a specific defense.232 Indeed, it seems unnecessary and
230 It should be noted that if the question of access is limited to just United States consumers, the result
may be more complex. Because the United States is one of the richest countries in the world, eliminating
international price discrimination might reduce prices domestically while increasing them in other countries. It
is doubtful that this was the intent of the Supreme Court in Quality King or Kirtsaeng. Moreover, in many
cases, even this change is unlikely. It is implausible that the Kirtsaeng decision, for example, will lead to a
reduction in prices of textbooks in the United States. Publishers, if forced to make a choice, will likely prefer
to keep prices high, even if that means losing practically all sales in developing countries. Rub, supra note 20,
at 46–47.
231 See Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 131.
232 The Supreme Court in Kirtsaeng was concerned that a ruling for the publisher in that case would have
prevented private importation. See infra note 233. Even if one perceives private importation as very important,
these concerns seem greatly overstated. First, 17 U.S.C. § 602(a)(3)(B) states that importation of one copy for
the private use and not for distribution and importation of copies that form part of the personal baggage of
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unreasonable to allow Costco, Kirtseang, and the like to make millions in
international arbitrage just to preserve low information costs so that some
would be able to buy a single book in Europe for their spouses.233
Applying the same framework to domestic resale markets leads to different
results. In domestic markets, copyright-exhaustion doctrine typically has only
modest effects on incentives. Geographic segmentation is not broadly used
domestically, and even when it is, it does not bring about significant profits,
partly because the differences in consumer willingness to pay among various
markets are not significant. Those smaller differences might also increase the
likelihood that price discrimination, when used, will limit access.234 Therefore,
because the limitations on price discrimination are modest, and because access
is not expected to be harmed by the application of copyright exhaustion to
domestic markets, it also should not cause meaningful undesirable distributive
effect or significantly reduce spillovers.
In contrast, requiring a license for any domestic resale significantly
increases transaction costs. Many resellers in domestic resale markets are
laymen who engage in resale sporadically and on a small scale. They might be
individuals who sell their possessions on eBay, Craigslist, or in yard sales. As
explained in Part V.B, requiring them to spend resources to inquire about their
future resale rights or to secure a license will raise information costs
significantly and create a powerful chilling effect on those markets, and then
on the initial markets as well. In addition, unauthorized resale transactions,

someone arriving to the United States is not an infringement of copyright. Second, there are other mechanisms
in the Copyright Act that shield against liability for private importation, in particular the fair use defense.
17 U.S.C. § 107. Although private importation is non-transformative, it is also noncommercial and because the
transaction costs of securing a license for such a minor activity are high, the market harm to the copyright
owner seems negligible. Therefore, applying the four-factor test of Section 107 should lead to the finding of no
liability. Indeed, the fair use defense is designed to, among other things, deal with situations of high
transaction costs such as private importation. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1627–30 (1982).
Such an action might also be considered de minimis. See also infra note 233.
233 Some of the scenarios that were part of “the parade of horribles” in Kirtsaeng involved private
importation. During oral argument Justice Sotomayor asked whether the publisher’s position means that one
cannot buy a book in England and bring it as a gift to his wife in the United States. Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 165, at 27. Similar concerns appeared in the majority opinion. Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley
& Sons, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1365 (2013) (“[U]nder [the publisher’s position] a contemporary tourist who
buys, say, at Shakespeare and Co. (in Paris), a dozen copies of a foreign book for American friends might find
that she had violated the copyright law.”). The analysis in this Part suggests that the Court is not just likely
wrong in reading the Copyright Act, see supra note 232, but that from a policy perspective it is a weak
justification for the massive commercial importation of Kirtsaeng and the like.
234 See Malueg & Schwartz, supra note 131.
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once they occur, might make the facilitators of those resale markets (eBay
itself or the owner of a physical market in which used copyrighted goods are
resold) liable for secondary copyright infringement,235 which will further chill
these markets. Because resale of physical items is typically desirable,236 this
chilling effect is detrimental to social welfare. In fact, contrary to the current
scope of copyright exhaustion, a copyright policy that is committed to reducing
information costs should allow unauthorized resale even with respect to
copyrighted goods that were illegally imported to the United States. Otherwise,
the information costs in investigating the origin of an item and the
circumstances in which it was imported will be very high.237
Therefore, there is a strong economic justification to the position taken in
Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion in Kirtsaeng. Copyright exhaustion should
be applied differently to importation and domestic resale. Importation, subject
to the exceptions on private importation, should require a license.238 Domestic
resale should not.
B. Digital Exhaustion
Copyright exhaustion applies to physical items but not to digital files.
Transferring a digital file requires the creation of a new copy, which violates
the copyright owner’s exclusive right of reproduction.239 This conclusion holds
even if the transferor’s copy is deleted. Recently, in Capitol Records, LLC v.
ReDigi, Inc., a district court held that the transfer of digital music files
constitutes both reproduction and distribution of a copyright-protected work,
235 See Fonavisa v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1996) (a company that operates a
market in which unlicensed copies are regularly sold is liable for indirect copyright infringement). The
doctrines of secondary liability for copyright infringement are complex, especially with respect to online sites,
as they are partly shielded by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 512. A full analysis of
the potential liability of online marketplaces, like eBay, had Kirtsaeng been decided differently, is thus
nontrivial and beyond the scope of this paper.
236 See supra text accompanying note 167.
237 Allowing free transfer of copies that were illegally imported will weaken the ability of copyright
owners to fight illegal importation because it will eliminate any incentives of domestic buyers in tracing the
origin of the goods they purchase. However, this seems like a necessary evil in order to reduce information
costs in domestic markets.
238 As explained above, see supra text accompanying note 39, a regime in which a copyright owner can
control importation is called national exhaustion. The analysis in this section thus supports such a regime, but
in some circumstances it can also support a regional exhaustion regime, similar to the one in the European
Union. See supra text accompanying note 41. Indeed, when countries in one region have similar economic
attributes, the harm from restricting price discrimination within the region is small, while applying exhaustion
might encourage intra-region trade by reducing information costs.
239 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2012).
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which is not protected by either fair use or copyright exhaustion.240 This
decision is consistent with the position taken by the Copyright Office in a 2001
study.241 Many have criticized this position and called for a broader
interpretation of copyright exhaustion under current law and for a change in
the law that will provide effective copyright exhaustion in the digital world.242
The increase in the volume of digital distribution of copyrighted goods,243
which is expected to be further encouraged by the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kirtsaeng,244 brings this question to the forefront of copyright discourse.245
The Internet Policy Task Force within the Department of Commerce is
currently conducting a study on the topic.246
While this Article does not question that more and more copyrighted works
are expected to be distributed digitally and thus, under current law, not to be
covered by the copyright-exhaustion doctrine, it doubts that this will negatively
affect social welfare. Indeed, the framework developed in this Article explains

240

934 F. Supp. 2d 640, 652–56 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). In that case, the court found that copyright exhaustion
did not apply because the files were first transferred from the seller to a third party’s server and then to the
buyer. Because the transfer from the seller to the third party was an infringement of the exclusive right of
reproduction, any future transfers of that file, including to the buyer, would not be covered by copyright
exhaustion, which only applies to “lawfully made” copies. Therefore, in contrast, copyright exhaustion might
apply in a direct transfer from a seller to a buyer. However, in practice, this will have no effect. Copyright
exhaustion is a defense only with respect to the right of distribution, and therefore a transfer of a digital file
will always infringe the exclusive right of reproduction. It should be noted that the decision in ReDigi is
inconsistent with that of the European Court of Justice, which recently held that the principles of copyright
exhaustion apply in the distribution digital software. Case C-128/11, UsedSoft GmbH v. Oracle Int’l Corp.
2012 E.C.R. I-0000, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:62011CJ
0128.
241 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, DMCA SECTION 104 REPORT 78–105 (2001), available at
http://www.copyright.gov/reports/studies/dmca/sec-104-report-vol-1.pdf. That study concluded that as a matter
of current law, copyright exhaustion applies only to physical copies, and as a matter of policy, that law should
not be changed.
242 E.g., Asay, supra note 21, at 21–23; Lemley & McKenna, supra note 167, at 2116 (arguing that
copyright exhaustion has an important role in restricting the power of the copyright owner); Perzanowski &
Schultz, supra note 5. But see Volokh, supra note 21, at 830–32 (explaining how the control that publishers
have over digital distribution can allow them to offer cheaper textbooks to students). This section suggests,
inter alia, that Professor Volokh is correct and that it is not obvious that expanding copyright exhaustion will
limit the market power of copyright owners in a way that will reduce prices and promote social welfare. See
also supra note 167.
243 See Volokh, supra note 21, at 823.
244 See Asay, supra note 21, at 23.
245 See Maria A. Pallante, The Next Great Copyright Act, 36 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 315, 331–32 (2013)
(a lecture by the Register of Copyrights of the United States and Director of the U.S. Copyright Office
discussing the possibility that Congress will revise the Copyright Act to deal with exhaustion with respect to
digital distribution).
246 COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note 3, at 35–37.
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that digital exhaustion might cause more harm than good, especially because it
has the potential to cause massive damage to incentives.
Digital exhaustion might lead to piracy, which will naturally harm
incentives. Indeed, when Anne transfers a physical book to Bob, as the
copyright-exhaustion doctrine allows her to do, he gets to possess the book and
she does not. If both of them would like to read the book at the same time, they
will need to purchase another copy. Even if copyright exhaustion applies to
digital books, Anne will obviously not be legally allowed to “transfer” a copy
to Bob while keeping a copy for her own use. However, doing so is feasible in
the digital world and in fact not very difficult, and so the temptation might be
too big. In that respect, digital exhaustion might foster piracy.
Moreover, there is a clear conflict between promoting digital exhaustion
and the current legal regime, which encourages the use of Digital Rights
Management devices (DRMs) as a tool to reduce piracy. DRMs are electronic
tools that are typically attached to files containing copyrighted works and limit
the users’ actions with respect to the file, including the reproduction and
distribution thereof. The circumvention of DRMs is typically illegal.247
Because DRMs can prevent transfer of digital files, any practical
implementation of copyright exhaustion in the digital world would require
regulating and limiting DRMs.248 However, because DRMs are an important
tool in the fight against online piracy, regulating them or limiting their scope of
protection might not be trivial and might encourage online piracy and
discourage copyright owners from using modern methods of digital
distribution.249
However, even if—somehow—the problem of piracy can be solved,
copyright exhaustion is expected to cause significant harm to incentives. To
appreciate this damage, one must observe that used digital works provide a
perfect substitute for new copies because they do not naturally wear and tear.
That means that some copies will be used by many buyers along the chain of
digital possession, which, as will be further explained below, will significantly
247 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2012) (providing, inter alia, that, subject to certain exceptions, circumvention of
DRMs that control access to copyrighted work, as well as the manufacturing or trafficking in any technology
or product that is designed for circumventing DRMs that restrict access, copying, or distribution of
copyrighted works, is illegal).
248 See Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 7, at 2120–23 (suggesting that circumventing DRMs, to
facilitate actions that should be shielded by copyright exhaustion, should be allowed).
249 DRMs pose serious challenges to various information-goods policies, such as fair use and privacy. A
full analysis of these problems is far beyond the scope of this Article.
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harm the market share of the copyright owner. The Copyright Office made this
point clear:
Time, space, effort and cost no longer act as barriers to the movement
of copies, since digital copies can be transmitted nearly
instantaneously anywhere in the world with minimal effort and
negligible cost. The need to transport physical copies of works, which
acts as a natural brake on the effect of resales on the copyright
owner’s market, no longer exists in the realm of digital transmissions.
The ability of such “used” copies to compete for market share with
new copies is thus far greater in the digital world.250

Because digital copies can be distributed indefinitely, copyright owners
cannot know or even reasonably estimate how many buyers along the chain of
distribution will use each copy they sell. Therefore, and because copyright
exhaustion does not allow discrimination between heavy and light users, sellers
will have significant difficulties in determining the price of digital copies. This,
in turn, can create a real chilling effect on the initial distribution of digital work
and on the incentives to create.
This claim can be illustrated by examining the market for textbooks. Let’s
assume that exhaustion applies to digital textbooks, which means that buyers
can freely transfer a digital textbook as they please, although they are not
allowed to create two simultaneously accessible copies of one purchased
textbook. Some buyers will buy the digital textbook just for their own personal
use. As with physical books, others will buy the textbooks for their usage (e.g.,
during one semester) but will resell it afterwards. Those copies might continue
to change hands indefinitely.251 In addition, because changing possession of a
digital file is so easy, many students will share digital books. In fact, some
commercial entities can provide those services on a large scale. Consider, for
example, a company that will buy digital copies of a textbook and sell a
subscription service to use them. Whenever a student needs the textbook, the
student’s computer automatically borrows it from the company, the student
reads it, and then, automatically, the computer returns the possession of the
digital book to the company. Because few people read the same textbook at the
exact same time, the company can probably buy only a few dozen copies but
serve hundreds of students. This will cause substantial harm to the market of
the copyright owner. It might discourage the publisher from even publishing
250

U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 241, at 82–83.
This of course encourages publishers to release frequent updates to their textbooks, even when it is
socially inefficient to do so. See Volokh, supra note 21, at 830–31.
251
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digital textbooks, thus denying society this convenient and non-wasteful mode
of distribution.252
This social harm is caused because copyright exhaustion, if applicable in
the digital world, denies the producer the ability to price discriminate between
the light-usage students, those who purchased the book for personal use, and
the heavy-usage user, the commercial renting company. If price discrimination
is allowed—in other words, without copyright exhaustion—the copyright
owner can solve this problem by charging the company a price that reflects its
massive usage. In fact, nowadays, when digital unauthorized distribution is
illegal, that is exactly what publishers do. They sell digital books to libraries
under a specific license, which allows the libraries to grant access to many of
their patrons.253
Once one appreciates the significant harm to incentives, the question
becomes whether other factors can provide significant benefits that would
outweigh this harm. Copyright exhaustion, which, as analyzed in Part III, is a
price-discrimination-defeating tool, is not expected to significantly improve
access or spillovers. In fact, the analysis above suggests that it might
discourage digital distribution, which might lower access to the work and thus
spillovers.254 In addition, in the digital world there is practically no waste.255 If
Marshall purchased a digital book, society will lose nothing if, once he finishes
with the book, he discards it, and Taney, who also wants to read the book,
purchases another “copy” from the copyright owner. No wasteful production of
an additional book is required. The copyright owner, as the initial seller of the
good, is able to efficiently price it, setting a price that reflects the inability of
buyers to resell the good.
Limiting copyright exhaustion to the physical world should cause, at worst,
nothing more than a modest increase in information costs. As long as buyers
know what rights they have in the digital work they are buying—in other
words, as long as they know whether they will be able to resell or rent the
work—the market can properly operate. In contrast, as explained in Part V, if
252 Similar concerns motivated Congress to enact Title I of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, which
includes controversial anticircumvention provisions. 17 U.S.C. § 1201.
253 See, e.g., Volokh, supra note 21, at 832–33.
254 Chilling digital distribution will likely reduce access and spillovers not just because one additional
form of distribution is taken off the table. Digital distribution is a relatively cheap form of distribution, and
therefore, as long as copyright exhaustion is illegal, it fosters the implementation of creative pricediscrimination schemes, which can help serve buyers with low willingness to pay. See supra Part III.
255 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
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the buyers do not know their rights, the market will not operate efficiently. It is
an unresolved empirical question to what extent buyers of digital copyrighted
goods know whether they can transfer the items they purchase.256 It is likely
that in some cases they know their rights quite well and in others less so.257 To
the extent that buyers are unaware of their rights, a sensible policy might need
to promote this understanding among buyers,258 but it should not open the
floodgates by allowing unrestricted incentives-shuttering digital distribution.
C. Commercial Renting
The doctrine of copyright exhaustion provides that the owner of a copy of
copyrighted work has the right to rent that copy, including commercially for
profit.259 Therefore, even commercial libraries, such as Netflix DVDs and
Redbox, are not required to secure a license to commercially rent copyrighted
work. This aspect of copyright exhaustion is probably unique to American
law.260
This Article suggests that commercial for-profit libraries should probably
be required to purchase a separate renting license. The harm from allowing
256 Compare Perzanowski & Schultz, supra note 7, at 2069 (suggesting that individuals generally believe
that they have a right to noncommercial home recording and to copy and back up work for personal use), and
id. at 2079 (noting that consumers have a “reasonable expectation that when they buy something, they own
it—and as a result they are able to use, alienate, or dispose of their property as they see fit.”), with Robinson,
supra note 5, at 1491 (suggesting that the practice of restrictive licensing over digital work has been a standard
market practice for over thirty years, and therefore buyers expect to have limited rights).
257 Intuitively, it seems that when a transfer is technically impossible, such as with Amazon’s Kindle
eBook reader, or when buyers are savvy, they probably do not expect to be allowed to transfer copyrighted
digital work. Less savvy buyers might be surprised to know that even when transfer is technically feasible, for
example, when the purchased files do not include DRMs, it is legally prohibited. This intuition can be proved
or disproved with an empirical study. I am not aware of such a study.
258 Effectively disclosing pertinent information to consumers might not be trivial. See, e.g., Omri BenShahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647 (2011) (arguing that
disclosure rarely substantially improves the decision-making process of laymen); cf. Ian Ayres & Alan
Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 STAN. L. REV. 545 (2014) (claiming that
the law should mandate disclosure of unfavorable terms that are beyond the buyers’ expectations). Analyzing
the ways to promote buyers’ awareness and whether their benefits justify their costs is beyond the scope of this
Article.
259 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012). The Copyright Act, however, provides that sound recordings and software
may not be commercially rented with a license. Id. § 109(b). This limitation was added to the Copyright Act
because Congress was concerned that renting those items would lead to massive piracy.
260 While I have not explored the laws of all countries, I am unaware of another jurisdiction that provides
this right to commercial buyers. In the European Union, both renting and lending are exclusive rights of the
copyright owner and thus require a license. Rental Directive, supra note 22; see also, GHOSH, supra note 33
(exploring copyright exhaustion in the United States, the European Union, Canada, China, India, Japan, and
Brazil, and suggesting that only the United States allows commercial renting).

RUB GALLEYSPROOFS2

2015]

2/19/2015 12:32 PM

REBALANCING COPYRIGHT EXHAUSTION

807

these commercial libraries to freely rent copyrighted goods is a decrease in
incentives. Commercial for-profit libraries typically have a willingness to pay
that is significantly higher than that of those who buy these goods for personal
use. For example, Redbox usually rents each movie it owns about fifty
times,261 which means that it is probably willing to pay over $75 for a copy of
a typical movie.262 Most individual buyers are willing to pay significantly
less.263 Therefore, price discrimination is very lucrative when the copyright
owner needs to sell copies to both commercial libraries and individuals. As
explained in Part III, copyright exhaustion, which makes the separation
between these buyers difficult, thus harms the income of the copyright owner
and the incentives to create. At the same time, as also explained in Part III, the
effects of copyright exhaustion on public access to copyrighted works are
typically modest.
In addition, copyright exhaustion is expected to affect the pricing decisions
of some copyright owners. Because of the significant difference between the
willingness to pay of commercial renters and individual buyers, copyright
exhaustion might not cause the seller to completely abandon price
discrimination, but it will instead channel them to use price-discrimination
schemes that are not vulnerable to unauthorized renting. However, as
explained in Part IV.A, it is doubtful if those changes will improve social
welfare in the short run or in the long run.
For example, movie studios use timing to discriminate among buyers.
Under one version of this scheme, the initial price for movies for home
viewing is set high, which allows only libraries to access the goods, followed
by a low price, which provides access to individuals. The problem with this
strategy, from a social perspective, is that individuals are denied access for
several weeks or months, which is socially wasteful.264 Empirical work
261 See Redbox Automated Retail LLC v. Universal City Studios LLLP, Civil No. 08-766 (RBK), 2009
WL 2588748 (D. Del. Aug.17, 2009).
262 Redbox currently charges $1.50 for each night of DVD rental. See Our Prices Are Increasing a Little,
REDBOX, http://www.redbox.com/pricechange (last visited Feb. 7, 2015). With fifty rentals per DVD
(assuming that this number still holds) and even if each rental is only for one night, its income from renting a
DVD is $75. In addition, Redbox sells some of its old DVDs. The costs per DVD in running its services seems
to be relatively low. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that Redbox is willing to pay more than $75 per
DVD it can rent.
263 A good, although far from perfect, indication to the individual buyers’ willingness to pay is the price
that is charged from them. DVDs, even shortly after their release, are typically sold for less than $20. It is
likely that if many buyers would be willing to pay close to $75, prices would have been higher.
264 The most recent trend in this industry is to reverse the order of availability. DVDs are released first to
individuals, while libraries (e.g., Netflix and Redbox) rent them out only a few weeks later. While the studios

RUB GALLEYSPROOFS2

808

2/19/2015 12:32 PM

EMORY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:741

suggests that total short-term surplus in the market for movies for home
viewing in Europe, where libraries must secure a renting license, is higher than
in the United States, where they do not.265 In the long run, this scheme is
expected to also reduce the incentives to create.266
The need to reduce information costs, which can warrant copyright
exhaustion in some contexts, cannot justify free, unauthorized commercial
renting. Commercial, for-profit libraries are professional organizations that
deal with renting on a large scale and therefore they are not expected to face
significant information-costs problem.
Therefore, overall, the justifications for allowing the buyer of a copyrighted
work to commercially rent it seem weak. The law should probably disallow it.
Public libraries might present a more difficult case because they provide
access to typically weaker members of society and to researchers, who
regularly produce significant spillovers and benefits that are sometimes not
well represented by the consumers’ willingness to pay.267 Therefore, it might
make sense to treat public libraries differently. The existence of spillovers
might justify sponsoring access to works through libraries by compensating
copyright owners for public library lending, which is common in some
countries, including those within the European Union.268

cannot legally prevent libraries from buying the DVDs designated for individuals and renting them out, the
studios were able to contractually secure those arrangements by providing especially lucrative terms to the
libraries. These lucrative terms decrease the income of the copyright owner while harming individuals who
rent movies, who are now required to wait until the movie is available. In contrast, this new scheme eliminates
the harm to individual buyers of DVDs, which are now able to purchase DVDs earlier.
265 Mortimer, supra note 133. One drawback of this research is that its data is based on practices that are
more than a decade old. The 2004 study already suggested that new trends in home viewing might change the
relative static efficiency of each regime. Since the publication of this study, this market went through
additional significant changes. Therefore, it is possible that copyright exhaustion in the United States does not
currently harm access to home viewing. However, there is little doubt that it harms incentives.
266 See supra note 146.
267 See FRISCHMANN, supra note 159, at 72; Cohen, supra note 99, at 1804–05.
268 See, e.g., Rental Directive, supra note 22, art. 5, at 63–64 (granting members of the European Union
the ability to allow public lending if copyright owners are compensated); see also supra text accompanying
notes 43–44. A full analysis of this scheme, which is beyond the scope of this Article, must take into account
the source of this public financing and its related costs (e.g., the costs of the tax system).
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D. Contracting Around Copyright Exhaustion
Should a contractual promise to refrain from reselling or lending
copyrighted goods be enforced? The answer under current law is unclear.269
Some have argued that contracting around core doctrines in copyright law is
preempted by the Copyright Act.270 In recent years, however, contracting
around other core doctrines of copyright law has typically been enforced under
contract law.271
The analysis in previous Parts of this Article, and especially the discussion
in Part V regarding the need to keep information costs low, can shed light on
the complexity of this question. It could be argued that contracting around
copyright exhaustion should not be problematic because contractual
obligations require acceptance. Therefore, the argument goes, when a party—
typically the buyer—accepts the contract, that party becomes aware of its
terms and can properly evaluate them as part of the purchasing decision. If the
contract forbids resale, the buyer will be willing to pay less, which will prevent
the seller from offering such terms, unless it is efficient to do so. Under this
approach, the copyright-exhaustion doctrine provides default rules, but in some
cases the parties can choose to replace it with their own specific arrangements.

269

While the enforceability of promises that limit transferability under contract law is still an open
question, in several well-known decisions courts have refused to find copyright infringement when the
defendant ignored a limitation on transferability that was printed on the product. For example, in
Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 341 (1908), a minimum price printed on the cover of a book was
not enforced; in UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175, 1177–78 (9th Cir. 2011), a statement on the
cover of a promotional CD that prohibited resale was not enforced; and in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons,
Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1351, 1356 (2013), a notice printed in the textbooks that limited resale to certain countries was
not enforced. Cf. Epstein, supra note 5, at 503–05 (criticizing the holding of Augusto); Katz, supra note 55, at
130–33 (same).
270 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2012); see, e.g., RADIN, supra note 24, at 168–73; Benkler, supra note 151, at
429–35; Cohen, supra note 99, at 1812; Gordon, supra note 138, at 1378–86; Lemley, supra note 24, at 142–
43; Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1025,
1051–52, 1130 (1998); David Nimmer, Elliot Brown & Gary N. Frischling, The Metamorphosis of Contract
into Expand, 87 CALIF. L. REV. 17, 42–63 (1999); cf. Picker, supra note 17, at 295.
271 See, e.g., Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 979–81 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc)
(enforcing a contract that creates legal rights in an idea which is not protected by copyright); Bowers v.
Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1323–26 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (enforcing a provision that contracted around
the fair use defense); cf. Ritchie v. Williams, 395 F.3d 283, 287–88 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding a provision that
restricts future transfer of copyright is unenforceable under contract law); Canal+ Image UK Ltd. v. Lutvak,
773 F. Supp. 2d 419, 441–44 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (exploring the various approaches in the case law to the
enforcement of contracts that create norms that are inconsistent with copyright law doctrines); Rub, supra note
17, at 258.
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The problem with such an argument is that it ignores information costs.
Idiosyncratic contractual obligations add information costs to the interactions
between sellers and buyers.272 Instead of relying on the default rules and the
stable property law arrangements, buyers now need to spend resources on
evaluating the legal attributions of the product they purchase. In fact, in
modern markets most contractual obligations come in the form of long
boilerplate provisions, written in a legal language, which are sometimes
attached to the product itself.273 Understanding those terms requires buyers to
spend considerable resources.274 Therefore, it is common for buyers to neither
read nor be otherwise familiar275 with boilerplate provisions.276 This means
that the terms of the contract, including the terms that govern the right to resell,
cannot be taken into account in the buyers’ purchasing decisions, which can
result in inefficiency.277 In other words, if buyers cannot de facto take into
account whether they will be allowed to resell a product, sellers might be
tempted to prohibit resale even when it is inefficient to do so.278
272

Note that this section discusses the creation of idiosyncratic contractual obligation and not
idiosyncratic property rights. In other words, even if contracting around copyright exhaustion is allowed, those
arrangements are enforced only in contract law and not against third parties. Idiosyncratic property
arrangements create an even greater information costs problem. See, e.g., Merrill & Smith, supra note 197, at 8
(“The existence of unusual property rights increases the cost of processing information about all property
rights.”); Van Houweling, supra note 5, at 897–98.
273 These contracts that are attached to the good itself are called “viral” contracts because they are widely
spread with the “host” product. See Margaret Jane Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75
IND. L.J. 1125, 1132 (2000). This attachment guarantees that everyone who uses the product accepts the terms
of the contract. It does overcome the main limitation on contractual cause of action—the need to prove
privity—and thus blurs the line between a contractual right and a property right.
274 The information costs that are attributed to standard-form contracting are high because those forms are
complicated and because they vary from one to the other. This means that even if a buyer spends resources in
reading and understanding a form contract, this will not reduce the information costs in future transactions.
This is distinguishable from default rules, as even laymen can become familiar with them when they
repeatedly operate in the marketplace. Once they are familiar with the default rules the transaction costs
decreases. As mentioned above, see supra note 256 and accompanying text, it is unclear how well buyers are
aware of the default rules regarding copyright exhaustion, although intuitively it seems that most of them
expect to be able to resell a book they purchase in a bookstore but not a Kindle eBook, which is consistent
with the default rules. Cf. Omri Ben-Shahar, Regulation Through Boilerplate: An Apologia, 112 MICH. L. REV.
883, 887–89 (2014) (reviewing RADIN, supra note 24) (comparing the complexity of form agreements to that
of default rules).
275 See generally Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 258 (suggesting that it is better to ask whether buyers
expect the terms of the contract to be so one-sided than to inquire if they read it).
276 RADIN, supra note 24, at 12–15; Van Houweling, supra note 5, at 933–34.
277 Guy A. Rub, Market Regulation of Contractual Terms: A Sceptical View, 54 CAN. BUS. L.J. 258, 263
(2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2506375.
278 The reality is, of course, more complex. Even if buyers do not read contracts, other mechanisms might
limit the sellers’ ability to provide harsh terms, such as the sellers’ desire to preserve their reputation. Even if
harsh terms are included in the contract, the seller might not enforce them because it is too difficult to do so
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There is no easy solution to this problem.279 On one hand, it seems
desirable to allow some sellers to create specific arrangements that are
different from the default rules of copyright exhaustion. For example, record
companies would like to distribute promotional CDs to radio stations, music
critics, and reporters for free. The free distribution of those promotional CDs is
thus important to the operation of the music industry. However, allowing the
recipients of those promotional CDs to sell them cuts into the market share of
the record companies and might discourage them from providing free CDs.
Therefore, it seems socially desirable to allow record companies and radio
stations to contractually agree to limit the transferability of promotional
CDs.280 Similarly, it seems socially desirable to allow a software company and
a student to enter into a contract for the sale of cheap, student-version software
in which the student will promise not to transfer the product to nonstudents.281
On the other hand, as explained above, those arrangements—especially if
buried in long standard-form agreements—increase information costs, might
be ignored by buyers, and can cause a market failure by being included in an
agreement regardless of their inefficiency. While a full, detailed solution is
beyond the scope of this Article, it seems that neither full enforcement of all
contracts nor full preemption of all waivers of copyright exhaustion is
efficient. Contracts that are the result of negotiation should typically be
enforced because the parties are well aware of their rights and can take them
into account. In such a situation, the parties are aware of their legal rights, and
therefore information costs are less troubling. Boilerplate provisions, in
contrast, should be subject to legal scrutiny to make sure that they are
reasonable or fair.282 Boilerplate provisions that the buyer is unaware of and
and because it creates reputational harm. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts
in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006).
279 This problem is part of a bigger and especially complex challenge that contract law has been struggling
with for decades: when, and to what extent, should boilerplate provisions be enforced. These provisions look
like contractual obligations that were the result of an offer and acceptance but, on the other hand, because they
are rarely read, they might not represent the parties’ true assent. Obviously, this short section cannot solve the
bigger challenge but only shed light on the considerations that should go into this analysis in the context of
copyright exhaustion. For a comprehensive analysis, see generally RADIN, supra note 24.
280 Cf. UMG Recordings Inc. v. Augusto, 628 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2011). In that case, the Ninth Circuit
held that a statement on the cover of a free promotional CD, which prohibited resale, does not limit
transferability. However, in that case there was no doubt that the statement on the cover of the CD was not a
contract.
281 Cf. Adobe Sys. Inc. v. One Stop Micro, Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000) (discussing the
legality of reselling students’ version software to nonstudents under copyright law).
282 In Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc., Judge Dyk, dissenting in part, stated that contractual
limitations that are inconsistent with the Copyright Act should be enforced only if they are the result of
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that are not reasonable or fair should probably not be fully enforced.283 This
scheme may also incentivize sellers to make sure that buyers are aware of
contractual restrictions that are inconsistent with their reasonable
expectations.284
E. Nonownership Interests: Licensees Versus Owners
The discussion in section D can promote a more careful analysis of one of
the most complex questions regarding the scope of copyright exhaustion: what
norms should govern a transfer of interest that is allegedly not a sale.
The Copyright Act states that copyright exhaustion shields only “the owner
of a particular copy.”285 Therefore, possessors of copies who are not owners
are not entitled to this defense286 and must accept the copyright owner’s
control over the distribution of these copies.287 The most important category of
those who possess a copy without owning it are mere “licensees.”288

negotiation and not if they are part of a standard-form agreement. 320 F.3d 1317, 1335–38 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Dyk, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). This policy is far reaching and seems undesirable. As
suggested in this section, in some cases some standard-form agreements that contract around copyright law are
efficient and should probably be enforced. Moreover, Judge Dyk’s approach is inconsistent with the regulation
of boilerplate provisions in other areas of the law. Courts routinely enforce contractual provisions that limit the
rights of the buyers, even if those limitations are included in a standard-form agreement. See, e.g., AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011) (holding that parties can waive their right to class action,
including class action arbitration, in a standard-form agreement); see also Robinson, supra note 5, at 1475–76
(suggesting that the problem of enforcing shrinkwrap licenses “implicates practically the entire realm of
modern marketing”).
283 This framework for the enforcement of boilerplate provisions is similar, in many respects, to the rules
of contract unconscionability. Unconscionability sometimes bars the enforcement of standard-form agreements
to prevent “oppression and unfair surprise.” U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (2014). It is important to acknowledge that
while the abstract principles of legal scrutiny might be easily articulated, forming a detailed legal test to apply
them, which is beyond the scope of this Article, might not be trivial. See supra note 279.
284 Cf. Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 258 (suggesting that not enforcing terms in standard-form
agreements that are surprisingly detrimental to buyers will incentivize sellers to effectively disclose those
terms).
285 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (2012) (limiting copyright exhaustion to “the owner of a particular copy or
phonorecord lawfully made under this title”).
286 Id. § 109(d) (“The privileges [of copyright exhaustion] do not . . . extend to any person who has
acquired possession of the copy or phonorecord from the copyright owner . . . without acquiring ownership of
it.”).
287 Id. § 106(3).
288 The term “licensee,” in this context, while commonly used, is confusing and likely wrong. A license is
a promise not to enforce a right, typically a property right. In the context of copyright law, it is typically a
promise not to enforce one or several of the exclusive rights over the intangible nature of the work. Thus, a
copyright license that allows a publisher to make copies of a copyrighted book means that notwithstanding the
exclusive right of reproduction, the licensee (i.e., the publisher) cannot be sued for copyright infringement for
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Therefore, it is crucial to distinguish owners from licensees. The formers
get to control the distribution of copies of copyrighted works pursuant to the
principles of copyright exhaustion, while the latters do not.289 Moreover, as
discussed below, this distinction is crucial not only in determining the rights of
the parties to the transaction but those of third parties as well. Once a
transaction is not a sale but just a license, copyright exhaustion is unavailable
to the licensee and any future possessor of the copyright goods. In other words,
once a transaction over a copyrighted good is not a sale, any future possessor
along the chain of possession will be liable for copyright infringement for any
kind distributing the good.290
There are two main approaches for distinguishing owners from licensees.
Vernor v. Autodesk, Inc., the leading case in the Ninth Circuit on the topic,
states three factors that need to be considered:
[A] software user is a licensee rather than an owner of a copy where
the copyright owner (1) specifies that the user is granted a license;
(2) significantly restricts the user’s ability to transfer the software;
and (3) imposes notable use restrictions.291

usage that is consistent with the license. A copyright licensee may or may not be an owner of the physical
copies.
In contrast, in the context of copyright exhaustion, the identity of the owner of the exclusive rights, as
well as the existence of any license with respect to these exclusive rights, is almost irrelevant. The application
of copyright exhaustion depends on the personal property interest in the tangible copy. Thus, in this context,
the term “license” or “mere license” describes the relationship between the possessor and the tangible copy. It
is a form of possessory interest that is weaker than ownership but not identical to one of the familiar
nonownership possessory interests (such as “bailment” or “rent”). It is difficult to describe this possessory
interest in terms of “a promise not to sue.” Because this term, while confusing, is commonly used in the case
law, I will use it here as well. See Brian W. Carver, Why License Agreements Do Not Control Copy
Ownership: First Sales and Essential Copies, 25 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1887, 1931–37 (2010) (criticizing the
misuse of the term “licensee” in this context); see also Asay, supra note 21, at 18–19 (same).
289 There are additional rights that the Copyright Act dedicates just to owners. The most important of
these, except for copyright exhaustion, is probably the “essential step” defense, 17 U.S.C. § 117(a)(1), which
provides that owners of software can copy it to the computer’s memory. Because such a copy of a software is
created automatically every time it is used, nonowner possessors need a license to use a software, and their
usage can be limited by the terms of such a license. Jacobsen v. Katzer, 535 F.3d 1373, 1380–82 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
290 This makes the issues discussed in this section somewhat distinctive from the issues discussed in
section D. Section D explores whether the parties can write a contract that would limit copyright exhaustion
and enforce it under contract law. For example, can a seller sue, under contract law, a buyer who promised not
to resell a copyrighted product and yet does it? This section asks when should a transaction not be considered a
sale, which allows the seller (who is not really a seller but a licensor) to sue the buyer (who is actually just a
licensee) or any future possessor under copyright law for every transfer of possession in the copyrighted good.
291 621 F.3d 1102, 1111 (9th Cir. 2010).
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The most crucial aspect in this test and the way in which the Vernor court
applied it, is that it focuses exclusively on the four corners of the contract—a
standard-form agreement drafted by the seller—in order to determine the
nature of the buyer’s possessory interest. In that case, the owner of copyright in
a computer program was able to characterize a transaction as a mere license
and thus to prevent the resale of the physical objects (CD-ROMs) in which the
program was embodied, although that copyright owner originally placed those
objects in the stream of commerce.292
Other courts have adopted a different test to distinguish owners from mere
licensees. For example, the leading case in the Second Circuit shows more
deference to the buyers’ expectation. The Second Circuit stated as follows:
[I]t seems anomalous for a user whose degree of ownership of a copy
is so complete that he may lawfully use it and keep it forever, or if so
disposed, throw it in the trash, to be nonetheless [a licensee and
therefore] unauthorized to fix it when it develops a bug, or to make
an archival copy as backup security.293

The Second Circuit therefore applies an “economic realities” test, which
looks at the actual economic nature of the transaction in order to explore
whether it is sensible to consider it a sale.294 Therefore, if the transaction looks
like a sale, the Second Circuit will treat it as such, even if the standard-form
agreement characterizes it as a mere license.
The approach advocated by this Article, which suggests that the law should
balance various factors—and in particular the need to keep incentives high and
information costs low—in determining the scope of copyright exhaustion,
supports the “economic realities” approach of the Second Circuit.
The “four corners” approach of the Ninth Circuit seems inconsistent with
the need to keep information costs at bay. The Ninth Circuit is de facto
providing copyright owners with a plan of attack—magic words—that allow
292

Id. at 1103–06.
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 2005). This case did not directly address
copyright exhaustion but the related “essential step” defense. See supra note 289. However, the tests for
separating owners from licensees under the copyright exhaustion doctrine and under the “essential step”
defense are the same.
294 Krause, 402 F.3d at 124 (“[C]ourts should inquire into whether the party exercises sufficient incidents
of ownership over a copy . . . .”). This test did not originate in this case. In fact, prior to Vernor, several district
courts in California and, on some occasions, the Ninth Circuit itself, used it. See Carver, supra note 288, at
1915–20. Other federal courts of appeals use a somewhat similar test. On the development of the various
approaches in different courts, see id. at 1898–1925.
293
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them to contract around copyright exhaustion. As section D explains, buyers
do not read standard-form agreements, nor should they. Holding that a
transaction that looks like a sale (e.g., one that involves a single payment for
which an unlimited period of possession is granted) is not a sale, only because
of unread language in a standard-form agreement, frustrates the reasonable
expectation of the buyers. As explained in section D, this practice is
problematic from an information costs perspective and it can lead to inefficient
transactions in the marketplace.
In contrast, the focus of the Second Circuit on the buyers’ expectation is
consistent with the position this Article takes regarding the need to reduce
information costs. There are cases in which the possessor should not be
considered an owner and, therefore, should not be entitled to the copyright
exhaustion defense. For example, when the owner lends a copy to a possessor,
or when the parties agree that the possessor will hold the copy for a limited
time, subject to periodic payments, the possessor should not be considered an
owner. Because buyers typically know about the economics of their
transactions (e.g., whether they will be required to make periodic payments or
not), enforcing legal limitations on their rights when the economics of the
transaction does not treat them as owners is consistent with their expectations
and is efficient. In other cases, when the transaction looks like a traditional
sale, copyright exhaustion should be applied.
The superiority of the “economic realities” test over the “four corners” test
is even clearer when the interests of third parties are taken into account. As
explained above, when a transaction is a mere license over a certain copy (and
not a sale of that copy), the rights of third parties are restricted because all
future possessors of such a copy will not be considered owners. Therefore,
those possessors, whether or not they even had a chance to read the original
contract, would not be legally able to distribute the copy they paid for.
The Copyright Act does not include any effective mechanism that protects
the interests of future buyers in this situation,295 and therefore it might cause
third parties to spend resources on validating their rights. As explained in
295 When an agreement between two parties (e.g., a buyer and a seller) affects the rights of third parties
(e.g., future buyers), the law needs to deal with a notice problem: the need to inform these third parties of their
rights. This is a significant concern in the area of servitudes. See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text;
see also Van Houweling, supra note 5, at 893–99. There are various ways that the law can mitigate this
problem including registration, see supra note 214, or the doctrine of bona fide purchaser without notice,
which, in some cases, grants such a purchaser clean title, see, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 342 (1981). However, currently, the Copyright Act does not include any such mechanism.
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Part V, this will inefficiently raise information costs, which is a form of waste
and might create a chilling effect on the market. Therefore, current law should
be interpreted in a way that minimizes the harm to third parties. The Ninth
Circuit’s four corners test seems especially inconsistent with this interpretive
approach because it requires any buyer to examine the agreement between the
copyright owner and the first buyer as well as any subsequent agreement
between previous buyers in order to make sure that all these transactions were
characterized as sales. The Second Circuit’s economic realities approach better
protects third parties who can verify this reality more easily.296
CONCLUSION
In 1897, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. stated that it “is revolting to have no
better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of
Henry IV” and noted that it “it is still more revolting if the grounds upon which
it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from
blind imitation of the past.”297 Several years later, in 1908, the Supreme Court,
now with Justice Holmes among its ranks, created the copyright-exhaustion
doctrine.298

296 Notwithstanding these advantages, in some cases the Second Circuit’s economic-realities approach can
be burdensome on the copyright owner. Consider, for example, the distribution of cheap, student-version
software that limits the transferability of these copies to nonstudents. There seems to be real social value in
enforcing such a restriction. See supra note 281 and accompanying text. The seller–copyright owner can
include such restrictive language in the contract and can inform the students–buyers of this limitation and thus,
at least under the test proposed in section D, will have a cause of action in contract law if a buyer later
transfers the software to a nonstudent. But this contractual cause of action is ineffective against third parties
that buy the software without accepting the contract. For example, in Adobe Systems Inc. v. One Stop Micro,
Inc., 84 F. Supp. 2d 1086 (N.D. Cal. 2000), which deals with a company that regularly purchased studentversion software CDs and resold them to nonstudents, the plaintiff had no contractual cause of action. In that
case, the court classified the transaction (which looked like a sale) as a mere license, which allowed the
plaintiff to sue the defendant for copyright infringement.
Nevertheless, in situations like this, copyright owners can have other causes of action against third
parties, even without classifying the transaction as a mere license. For example, the copyright owner can sue
for intentional tortious interference with contractual relations because the third party intentionally encouraged
the students to breach their contract with the copyright owner. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766
(1979). The main advantage of the tortious interference cause of action over the copyright cause of action is
that it is more attentive to the problem of information costs because it requires the defendant to be aware of the
contractual limitation. While this and other possible solutions (e.g., limiting future distribution using a DRM)
might not be a perfect solution, as long as the Copyright Act does not include any other reasonable
mechanisms that allow buyers to reasonably verify their legal rights in items they purchase or to get a clean
title, the “economic reality” approach seems like the lesser of two evils.
297 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 469 (1897).
298 Bobbs-Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339 (1908).
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The world has changed in the century that has passed since that decision.
The markets for information goods have been revolutionized. Our
understanding of the forces that drive and shape markets, including markets for
information goods, has been developed and modernized as well as the legal
norms that police these markets. Therefore, it is only natural that the
copyright-exhaustion doctrine, which was originally motivated, to a large
degree,
by
the
early-twentieth-century
understanding
of
the
early-twentieth-century markets, will need to be reexamined and rebalanced
today.
This Article suggests that while the original rationales for copyright
exhaustion are weak justifications nowadays, the doctrine serves an important
social function by reducing information costs. Including the right to transfer
copyrighted goods within the bundle of rights of buyers sets reasonably clear
borders to the property rights of those buyers and thus helps diminish
information costs.
Copyright exhaustion also has costs. The main harm of the doctrine is a
possible reduction in the incentives to create and an undesirable, regressive
distributive effect. Therefore, on one hand, the doctrine should be interpreted
broadly where information costs are high and the reduction in incentives, as
well as the regressive distributive effect, is moderate. On the other hand, it
should be interpreted narrowly when information costs are low and the
reduction in incentives, as well as the regressive distributive effect, is
significant.
This Article shows how those considerations can shape the scope of the
copyright-exhaustion doctrine and help it tackle the major questions it faces in
recent years. The Article suggests that copyright exhaustion should not prevent
the copyright owner from exercising control over the commercial importation
of copyrighted goods or over the digital distribution of works. However,
contracting around the doctrine should be subject to legal scrutiny and
copyright owners should not be allowed to circumvent the norms of exhaustion
just by including “magic words” that limit transferability and that categorized
buyers as mere licensees in their standard-form agreements.
Implementing the balanced approach advocated by this Article should
allow the copyright-exhaustion doctrine to better meet the challenges of the
twenty-first century.

